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LEGISLATIVE SOLUTIONS TO STINGRAY USE:
REGULATING CELL SITE SIMULATOR TECHNOLOGY
POST-RILEY
Ada Danelo*
Abstract: In Riley v. California, the United States Supreme Court held that law
enforcement must generally obtain a warrant before searching the contents of an individual’s
cell phone. However, Riley did not address whether the warrant requirement extended to cell
phone metadata, e.g. non-content information such as location information. This gap creates
uncertainty as to whether law enforcement officers must obtain a warrant to use Cell Site
Simulators, a portable technology that mimics a cell tower to get location information
metadata from cell phones. Law enforcement has justified the warrantless gathering of cell
site information under the third-party doctrine, which provides that there is no Fourth
Amendment-protected privacy interest in information made available to a third party such as
a phone service provider. Riley did not explicitly address the warrant requirement in the
context of metadata. And until recently, post-Riley circuit courts were split on whether a
warrant is required for metadata. A legislative resolution of this uncertainty is thus useful,
both to safeguard individual privacy and to provide clear but not overly restrictive rules for
law enforcement. This Note will address what legislative solutions states have pursued, and
the benefits and shortcomings of each option.

INTRODUCTION
A cell site simulator, more commonly known as a StingRay, is a
portable device that mimics a cell tower so that nearby cell phones will
connect to it.1 A StingRay can obtain cell site location information
(CSLI) without the cell phone user’s knowledge or consent.2 Law
enforcement finds this information very useful, but media and citizens
groups have criticized StingRays.3 One group argues that “[y]ou don’t
have to be a criminal to be caught in this law enforcement snare. You
*

With thanks to Professor Mary D. Fan for her excellent guidance, and to Peter Danelo, Bruno da
Silva, and the admirable staff of Washington Law Review for their help in editing.
1. Jennifer Valentino-DeVries, ‘StingRay’ Phone Tracker Fuels Constitutional Clash, WALL
ST. J. (Sept. 22, 2011), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB100014240531119041946045765831
12723197574 [https://perma.cc/5BPH-2NE7].
2. Id. (“A stingray works by mimicking a cellphone tower, getting a phone to connect to it and
measuring signals from the phone. It lets the stingray operator ‘ping,’ or send a signal to, a phone
and locate it as long as it is powered on[.]”).
3. Kate Martin, Tacoma Police Using Surveillance Device to Sweep up Cellphone Data, NEWS
TRIB. (Aug. 26, 2014), http://www.thenewstribune.com/news/local/article25878184.html [https://
perma.cc/L28S].
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just have to be near one and use a cellphone.”4 This Note seeks an
approach that strikes a balance between these safety and privacy
concerns.
StingRays raise conflicting interests between law enforcement and the
communities they protect. They provide legitimate benefits to society by
helping officers quickly find violent criminals and individuals in need,
yet they present privacy concerns that officers will overstep their bounds
and use StingRays for warrantless snooping into the lives of ordinary
civilians.
Law enforcement officers use StingRays to, among other purposes,
locate crime suspects and assist search-and-rescue teams.5 One police
department’s records indicate that the department used its StingRay
nearly 100 times between 2011 and 2015.6 In seventy-six of those
instances, the department obtained a judge’s approval to use the
StingRay in searches for fugitives, murder suspects, or other violent
criminals.7 In twenty-one cases, the department used the StingRay
without a warrant under emergency circumstances: to find missing
persons, kidnapping victims, or other people in peril.8
Despite the technological advantages that StingRays present to law
enforcement in their efforts to protect the public, privacy advocates are
concerned that law enforcement uses these devices to track bystanders
without a warrant.9 “They are essentially searching the homes of
innocent Americans to find one phone used by one person,” according to
Christopher Soghoian of the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU),
who characterizes the technology as akin to “kicking down the doors of
50 homes and searching 50 homes because they don’t know where the
bad guy is.”10 Soghoian describes StingRay technology as a high-tech
game of “Marco Polo,” in which the StingRay sends a “Marco” signal,
and all cellphones within range are indiscriminately compelled to

4. Id.
5. Valentino-DeVries, supra note 1. (“The device has various uses, including helping police
locate suspects and aiding search-and-rescue teams in finding people lost in remote areas or buried
in rubble after an accident.”).
6. Glenn E. Rice, Secret Cellphone Tracking Device Used by Police Stings Civil Libertarians,
KAN. CITY STAR (Sept. 5, 2015, 3:24 PM), http://www.kansascity.com/news/business/technology/
article34185690.html [https://perma.cc/8V8G-4CK5].
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Martin, supra note 3.
10. Id.
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respond “Polo” without the owner’s knowledge that the cell phone
passed data to government equipment instead of a cellphone tower.11
While individual law enforcement organizations’ practices vary,
many, such as the Department of Justice, maintain that they take
precautions to limit their StingRay use.12 The United States Department
of Justice deletes data no less than once daily, and does so as soon as the
target cell phone is located.13 The Police Department of Tacoma,
Washington, issued a press release stating that the department’s
investigators “only use the device to locate suspects named in search
warrants.”14
This Note details potential state legislation to address law
enforcement’s StingRay use. Part I explains StingRay technology. Part II
provides background on the United States Supreme Court’s relevant
Fourth Amendment precedent and describes how circuit courts have
treated CSLI. Part III explains why United States Supreme Court action
is unlikely in the near future and advocates for a legislative solution to
the issue. Part IV explains state legislative solutions currently in use and
other options available to state legislatures.
I.

THE RISE OF LAW ENFORCEMENT USE OF STINGRAY
TECHNOLOGY

Cell phones are widely used in the United States.15 As of January
2014, ninety percent of American adults owned a cell phone.16 As of
October 2014, sixty-four percent of American adults owned a
smartphone.17 People use their cell phones to email, text, get directions,
and even to share their location by “checking in” at physical sites.18 For
a cell phone to provide many of these services, it must connect to a

11. Id.
12. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Justice Department Announces Enhanced Policy for Use
of Cell-Site Simulators (Sept. 3, 2015), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/justice-departmentannounces-enhanced-policy-use-cell-site-simulators [https://perma.cc/7HFE-QSU8].
13. Id.
14. Drew Mikkelsen, Tacoma, Wash., Police Use Cell-Phone Tracking Device, U.S.A. TODAY
(Aug. 28, 2014, 4:59 PM), http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation-now/2014/08/28/cellphone-tracking-stingray/14751105/ [https://perma.cc/TQS3-CUKD].
15. Mobile Technology Factsheet, PEW RESEARCH CTR. (Dec. 27, 2013), http://www.pewinternet.
org/fact-sheets/mobile-technology-fact-sheet [https://perma.cc/HVJ5-P7YN].
16. Id. (rising to 97% and 98% for the 30–49 and 18–29 age groups).
17. Id.
18. Maeve Duggan, Cell Phone Activities 2013, PEW RESEARCH CTR. (Sept. 19, 2013),
http://www.pewinternet.org/2013/09/19/cell-phone-activities-2013 [https://perma.cc/HJT2-2VVL].
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cellular network.19 Cell towers achieve this connection by transmitting
the network’s data to a phone and simultaneously capturing the phone’s
location.20
Cell phones operate by connecting to cell towers, regularly updating
their location to those towers, and then paging those towers to receive or
transmit calls.21 To make calls, a cell phone must constantly relay its
location to the nearest cell towers.22 The cell towers identify each phone
by its assigned ten-digit phone number as well as by the phone’s
unchangeable electronic serial number.23 Cell phones connect with cell
towers approximately every seven seconds.24 When a cell phone pings
surrounding cell towers, it connects to up to seven nearby towers.25
Phones transmit these location signals on a separate frequency from the
frequencies that relay cell phone calls and data.26 The cellular network
uses these signals to locate a phone whenever it receives a call.27
Unlike real-time tracking, historical CSLI refers to the location
information from cell towers collected over time.28 Historical CSLI is
“non-content” information: it does not include the content of any calls or
data transmitted.29 Cellular networks retain historical CSLI for billing
purposes.30 The amount of CSLI retained by a cellular network depends

19. See Cell Phone and Service Buying Guide, CONSUMER REP. (Mar. 2016),
http://www.consumerreports.org/cro/cell-phones-services/buying-guide.htm?pn=2
[https://perma.cc/XZ6E-C995].
20. See Hearing on Electronic Communications Privacy Act Reform Before the Subcomm. on the
Constitution, Civil Rights, and Civil Liberties of the H. Comm. on Judiciary, 111th Cong. 5 (2010)
[hereinafter Hearing] (statement of Prof. Orin Kerr).
21. Heath Hardman, The Brave New World of Cell-Site Simulators, 8 ALB. GOVT. L. REV. 1, 12,
14–16 (2015).
22. See Transcript of Record at 7–8, United States v. Sims (E.D. Pa. Nov. 13, 2007) (No. 06-674)
http://www.eff.org/files/filenode/celltracking/shutetestimony.pdf
[https://perma.cc/97JA-D2JM]
(testimony of William Shute).
23. Note, Who Knows Where You’ve Been? Privacy Concerns Regarding the Use of Cellular
Phones as Personal Locators, 18 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 307, 309 (2004).
24. Kevin McLaughlin, Note, Fourth Amendment and Cell Phone Location Tracking: Where Are
We?, 29 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 421, 426 (2007) (reviewing prospective CSLI
jurisprudence).
25. Transcript of Record, supra note 22, at 9 (testimony of William Shute).
26. McLaughlin, supra note 24, at 426.
27. Id.
28. See Hearing, supra note 20, at 5.
29. Id. at 6.
30. Transcript of Record, supra note 22, at 10 (testimony of William Shute).
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on that network’s policy, though most networks retain CSLI for over a
year.31
Law enforcement commonly requests historical or real-time CSLI
from cellular providers for use in investigations.32 Officers can use this
information to ascertain from where and with whom a suspect
communicates.33 A cell phone’s proximity to a given cell tower, the
signal strength, and the cell phone’s movement between towers reveal
the phone’s location.34
Courts have begun to address historical CSLI.35 The evidentiary
standard that officers must show when requesting CSLI varies by
jurisdiction and by type of CSLI.36 Depending on the jurisdiction,
officers may obtain CSLI by requesting a subpoena, court order, or
warrant.37 A subpoena, which commands the production of documents or
a personal appearance before a court, requires no showing of suspicion.38
A court order, on the other hand, requires reasonable suspicion that a
suspect is involved in criminal activity.39 A warrant, the most protective
standard, requires probable cause that a suspect has committed a crime
or that a search will reveal evidence of a crime.40
Jurisdictions differ in how they address CSLI, even before the added
layer of complexity presented by StingRay use. A StingRay, as
described earlier, is a portable device that pretends to be a cell tower so
31. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, RETENTION PERIODS OF MAJOR CELLULAR SERVICE PROVIDERS
(Aug.
2010),
https://www.aclu.org/cell-phone-location-tracking-request-response-cell-phonecompany-data-retention-chart [https://perma.cc/PVN3-8VTC].
32. See Zachary Ross, Note, Bridging the Cellular Divide: A Search for Consensus Regarding
Law Enforcement Access to Historical Cell Data, 35 CARDOZO L. REV. 1185, 1187 (2014).
33. Scott A. Fraser, Comment, Making Sense of New Technologies and Old Law: A New
Proposal for Historical Cell-Site Location Jurisprudence, 52 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 571, 582
(2012).
34. Id.
35. Id. at 574–76 (discussing the judiciary’s treatment of CSLI).
36. Ross, supra note 32, at 1187.
37. Id. at 1187, 1198–99. See also Part II.B.2.iii.
38. U.S. DEP’T. OF JUST., OFF. OF LEGAL POL’Y, REPORT TO CONGRESS ON THE USE OF
ADMINISTRATIVE SUBPOENA AUTHORITIES BY EXECUTIVE BRANCH AGENCIES AND ENTITIES,
https://www.justice.gov/archive/olp/rpt_to_congress.htm#2a1
[https://perma.cc/QB3K-WDPX]
(“Administrative subpoena authorities allow executive branch agencies to issue a compulsory
request for documents or testimony without prior approval from a grand jury, court, or other judicial
entity.”); U.S. MARSHALS SERV., SERVICE OF PROCESS: CRIMINAL SUBPOENA,
http://www.usmarshals.gov/process/subpoena.htm [https://perma.cc/2ZHX-UZ7E].
39. 18 U.S.C. § 3583 (2012); Devallis Rutledge, Probable Cause and Reasonable Suspicion,
POLICE MAGAZINE (June 7, 2011), http://www.policemag.com/channel/patrol/ articles/2011/
06/probable-cause-and-reasonable-suspicion.aspx [https://perma.cc/W4YZ-N3NY].
40. Rutledge, supra note 40.
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that it can measure a target phone’s signal strength from multiple
locations to determine where that phone is located.41 In many cases, the
government has first gathered historical CSLI to determine the general
area of the target cell phone.42 After simulating a cell tower, StingRays
page the target cell phone.43 They continue paging the target phone until
they have sufficient readings to locate the phone.44 The Federal Bureau
of Investigation (FBI) has used StingRays since at least 1995.45 More
recently, local law enforcement agencies have begun to use StingRays.46
Cell phone companies’ newfound resistance to CSLI requests has
contributed to an increase in law enforcement’s use of StingRays.47
Historically, law enforcement agencies could easily request CSLI from
phone companies under the Stored Communications Act (SCA).48 But as
concern has grown about maintaining digital privacy, phone companies
have become more resistant to cooperating with law enforcement.49 The
New York Times notes that “[w]ith the rapid expansion of cell
surveillance have come rising concerns—including among carriers—
about what legal safeguards are in place to balance law enforcement
agencies’ needs for quick data against the privacy rights of
consumers.”50 Many companies now employ legal staff specifically to
41. EPIC v. FBI: StingRay/Cell Site Simulator, ELECTRONIC PRIVACY INFO. CTR.,
http://epic.org/foia/fbi/stingray/ [https://perma.cc/6WZ8-L557].
42. Id.
43. Kim Zetter, Secrets of FBI Smartphone Surveillance Tool Revealed in Court Fight, WIRED
MAG. (Apr. 9, 2013, 6:30 AM), https://www.wired.com/2013/04/verizon-rigmaiden-aircard/
[https://perma.cc/3B5U-L63W].
44. Id. (describing how coordinates are overlaid to find a phone’s location). Although some cellsite simulators are capable not only of tracking but also of listening to phone calls, this Note only
addresses the location-specific StingRay technology. See Andy Greenberg, Despite FCC “Scare
Tactics,” Researcher Demos AT&T Eavesdropping, FORBES (July 31, 2010, 5:35 PM),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/firewall/2010/07/31/despite-fcc-scare-tactics-researcher-demos-atteavesdropping/ [https://perma.cc/HZ2V-4TRZ].
45. EPIC v. FBI: StingRay/Cell Site Simulator, supra note 41.
46. See, e.g., Martin, supra note 3.
47. See, e.g., Hope King, Tech Companies Standing up to Government Data Requests, CNN
MONEY (June 18, 2015, 6:06 PM), http://money.cnn.com/2015/06/18/technology/data-protectiongovernment/ [https://perma.cc/JE3F-EB9J]; Ellen Nakashima, Apple Vows to Resist FBI Demand to
Crack iPhone Linked to San Bernadino Attacks, WASH. POST (Feb. 17, 2016),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/us-wants-apple-to-help-unlock-iphoneused-by-san-bernardino-shooter/2016/02/16/69b903ee-d4d9-11e5-9823-02b905009f99_story.html
[https://perma.cc/BK69-GCWM].
48. Stored Communications Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2703 (2002), 18 U.S.C. §§ 2701–2712 (2002).
49. Eric Lichtblau, More Demands on Cell Carriers in Surveillance, N.Y. TIMES (July 8, 2012),
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/07/09/us/cell-carriers-see-uptick-in-requests-to-aid-surveillance.html
[https://perma.cc/4XEY-SZXH].
50. Id.

14 - Danelo.docx (Do Not Delete)

2016]

LEGISLATIVE SOLUTIONS TO STINGRAY USE

10/4/2016 5:13 PM

1361

respond to law enforcement records requests, perhaps in response to
public perception that these companies are overly compliant with the
government.51 Companies including AT&T and T-Mobile require a
warrant before they will allow law enforcement access to a user’s
current location data, while others, including Verizon and Cricket, say
they cannot provide current location data at all.52
StingRays bypass the need to request real-time CSLI from a cellular
provider by enabling law enforcement to track a cell phone
independently.53 StingRays are a major technological improvement for
law enforcement over historical CSLI. However, they raise privacy
concerns because they enable law enforcement to bypass a third party,
the phone company, to obtain CSLI. According to the ACLU, the
prevalence of StingRays is worrisome; as of early 2016, they were used
by at least fifty-seven agencies in twenty-two states.54 Until now,
legislatures and courts have failed to adequately address CSLI’s effect
on the competing values of efficient law enforcement and individual
privacy.
II.

THE FOURTH AMENDMENT AND TECHNOLOGY-AIDED
INVESTIGATION

The Fourth Amendment provides that the
right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers,
and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not
be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable
cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly
describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to
be seized.55
The United States Supreme Court has held that the Fourth
Amendment protects only an expectation of privacy that is “reasonable”

51. See Brian X. Chen, A Senator Plans Legislation to Narrow Authorities’ Cellphone Data
Requests, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 9, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/12/09/technology/asenator-plans-legislation-to-narrow-authorities-cellphone-data-requests.html [https://perma.cc/SD
G5-8WMK].
52. Id.
53. See supra notes 1–3 and accompanying text.
54. American Civil Liberties Union, Stingray Tracking Devices: Who’s Got Them?,
https://www.aclu.org/map/StingRay-tracking-devices-whos-got-them
[https://perma.cc/6RMP6VWK].
55. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
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or “legitimate.”56 Once a court has determined that a search occurred, the
question becomes whether that search was reasonable under the Fourth
Amendment, and whether a warrant was necessary.57 The Fourth
Amendment itself does not define “reasonable,” but courts, including the
United States Supreme Court, have defined its limitations by providing
many exceptions to the warrant requirement.58 In fact, “[t]he vast
majority of searches conducted by government agents are lawful despite
the absence of a warrant; a substantial number of these are lawful despite
the lack of probable cause.”59
The Court has acknowledged that its own reasonable-expectation-ofprivacy standard may be “subjective and unpredictable.”60 The standard
is particularly unpredictable when applied to electronic surveillance,
which presents fact patterns that are hard to analogize to past cases.61
Indeed, the Court has tried to keep up with emerging technology for
nearly five decades using the Katz v. United States62 reasonableexpectation-of-privacy test—from infrared imaging in Kyllo v. United
States,63 to GPS tracking in United States v. Jones,64 and now
smartphones in Riley v. California.65
The Fourth Amendment requires a warrant based on probable cause to
search homes and other private premises or to intercept

56. See Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 740 (1979) (holding that a phone company’s use of a
pen register to provide police with a record of phone numbers that a suspect dialed from his landline
was not a Fourth Amendment search); Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (“there is a
twofold requirement, first that a person have exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy
and, second, that the expectation be one that society is prepared to recognize as ‘reasonable.’”).
57. See U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
58. Clifford S. Fishman, Searching Cell Phones After Arrest: Exceptions to the Warrant and
Probable Cause Requirements, 65 RUTGERS L. REV. 995, 999–1000 (2013).
59. Id. at 1001.
60. Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 34 (2001) (holding that a person has a reasonable
expectation of privacy against the government’s use of surveillance to learn about the inside of that
person’s home, particularly when the technology used is not available to the general public—thus
the government’s use of thermal imaging technology to measure the heat emanating from
defendant’s home was a search).
61. See 1 FISHMAN & MCKENNA, WIRETAPPING AND EAVESDROPPING: SURVEILLANCE IN THE
INTERNET AGE §§ 1:3–1:6 (3d ed. 2007).
62. See generally 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
63. See generally 533 U.S. 27 (2001).
64. See generally 565 U.S. __, 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012).
65. See generally 573 U.S. __, 134 S. Ct. 2473 (2014); see also Robinson Meyer, Do Police Need
a Warrant to See Where a Phone Is?, THE ATLANTIC (Aug. 8, 2015),
http://www.theatlantic.com/tech078nology/archive/2015/08/warrantless-cell-phone-locationtracking/400775/ [https://perma.cc/6KMA-5L7C].
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communications.66 A warrant is not required under the following
exceptions, when: (1) a search occurs incident to a lawful arrest; (2) an
object is in plain view; (3) the suspect gives consent to the search; (4) an
officer is engaged in a “stop and frisk” rather than a full search; (5) an
officer has probable cause to believe that an automobile contains
evidence of a crime; or (6) exigent circumstances exist (such as
emergencies or hot pursuit of a criminal).67 The most commonly used
exceptions to the warrant requirement are exigent circumstances based
on imminent risk of physical danger or destruction of evidence, and the
search of a person incident to arrest.68 Of special relevance to cell phone
searches is the plain view exception, which provides that information in
plain view, such as the photo on a cell phone’s screensaver, is not a
search.69 Under the plain view doctrine, police may answer a suspect’s
cell phone or respond to incoming text messages immediately following
arrest if officers have probable cause to believe that the phone was used
in connection with the crime.70 The exceptions to the warrant
requirement serve to balance efficiency and public safety with personal
privacy.
A.

Reasonable Expectations of Privacy and the Third Party Exposure
Doctrine

As described more thoroughly in Section III below, Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence is unclear as to whether a warrant is required

66. Fishman, supra note 58, at 1001–02; see also THOMAS K. CLANCY, THE FOURTH
AMENDMENT: ITS HISTORY AND INTERPRETATION 217-82 (2008) (discussing arrests and seizures,
only a small fraction of which require a warrant).
67. See, e.g., Kentucky v. King, 563 U.S. 452, 452 (2011) (quoting Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S.
385, 394 (1978)) (holding that no warrant is required for exigent circumstances); Horton v.
California, 496 U.S. 128, 141 (1990) (holding that officers can seize objects in plain view without a
search warrant); United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 823–24 (1982) (holding that no warrant is
required if the officer has probable cause that the automobile contains evidence of a crime),
overruled by Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 332 (2009) (concluding that once a driver has been
removed from a car and arrested, there is no longer any possibility that the driver could seize
anything in the vehicle and destroy it or use it as a weapon, and thus there is no justification for a
warrantless search of the car); Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 228 (1973) (holding that
consent-based searches are constitutionally acceptable); Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 759
(1969) (quoting Trupiano v. United States, 334 U.S. 699, 708 (1948)) (establishing the search
incident to arrest exception); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 27 (1968) (holding that officers can stop
and frisk if there is reasonable suspicion to believe the individual is dangerous).
68. Fishman, supra note 58, at 1002–03.
69. Id. at 1002.
70. 1 FISHMAN & MCKENNA, WIRETAPPING AND EAVESDROPPING: SURVEILLANCE IN THE
INTERNET AGE § 5:177 (3d ed. 2007).
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for CSLI. However, the third-party doctrine may wholly exempt CSLI
from Fourth Amendment protections.71 The third-party doctrine provides
that information voluntarily conveyed to a third party receives no Fourth
Amendment protection.72 Thus, the government can seize without a
warrant any information that an individual has willingly shared with a
third party.73
Under the third-party doctrine, when someone voluntarily conveys
information to another entity, such as a bank or a telephone company,
that person assumes the risk that the third party could disclose that
information to the government.74 In United States v. Miller,75 the Court
found that the defendant did not have a reasonable expectation of
privacy in the documents he provided to his bank.76 The government
could thus obtain those documents from the bank without a warrant,
even though the defendant may have assumed that the bank would only
use them for a limited purpose.77
There is also no reasonable expectation of privacy in phone numbers
that an individual dials. In Smith v. Maryland,78 the United States
Supreme Court found that the defendant had no expectation of privacy in
phone numbers that he called, since he voluntarily conveyed those same
numbers to the telephone company, a third party.79 The Court noted that
the disclosure statement at the front of a phone book alerts phone users
to their lack of privacy expectations when dialing a phone number.80 The
Court thus held that the installation of pen registers on the defendant’s
phone line was not a Fourth Amendment search.81 A pen register is an
electronic device that records the numbers dialed from a particular phone

71. See, e.g., United States v. Graham, 796 F.3d 332, 355 (4th Cir. 2015), rev’d en banc United
States v. Graham, 2016, Nos. 12-4659, 12-4825, 2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 9797, at *19–20 (4th Cir.
May 31, 2016) (holding that police did not need a warrant to obtain over 200 days worth of CSLI, as
they could instead rely on the third-party doctrine).
72. See Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979) (holding that government’s use of a pen register
to record the phone numbers dialed from defendant’s phone line was not a search).
73. See Smith, 442 U.S. at 735; United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435 (1976).
74. See Smith, 442 U.S. at 735; Miller, 425 U.S. at 443.
75. 425 U.S. 435 (1976).
76. Id. at 443.
77. Id.
78. 442 U.S. 735 (1979).
79. Id. at 744.
80. Id. at 742–43. (“Most phone books tell subscribers, on a page entitled ‘Consumer
Information,’ that the company ‘can frequently help in identifying to the authorities the origin of
unwelcome and troublesome calls.’”)
81. Id. at 746.
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line.82 Unlike in Katz, where the Court held that the government
eavesdropping on defendant’s phone calls was a search requiring a
warrant,83 the pen registers in Smith did not capture the contents of
defendant’s phone calls.84 Furthermore, “[a]ll telephone users realize
that they must ‘convey’ phone numbers to the telephone
company . . . .”85 Because a telephone user is aware that the phone
company monitors the numbers dialed to connect a call, under the Katz
test that person has no legitimate expectation of privacy.86 Courts have
applied the third-party doctrine to the address on the outside of an
envelope,87 and even to the interception of a telephone conversation by a
portable radio.88
Although the United States Supreme Court has not addressed CSLI,
all Circuit Courts of Appeals to rule on the issue have held that cell
phone users have no reasonable expectation of privacy in their CSLI.89
Because CSLI is information shared with a third party (the cellular
provider), users assume the risk of its disclosure.90 As in Smith, the
lower courts found that a defendant’s reasonable expectation of privacy
is negated by the average person’s knowledge of how phones work and
the fact that they expose location information to third parties.91
In Smith, the United States Supreme Court found several ways in
which a telephone subscriber objectively receives notice that the phone
company is documenting the subscriber’s dialing activity.92 By dialing,
the user realizes those digits are conveyed to the phone company to
complete the call; by reviewing the itemized bill, the user realizes that
the digits dialed are recorded; and by using a telephone book, the

82. Id. at 741–42.
83. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 350–53 (1967).
84. Smith, 442 U.S. at 741.
85. Id. at 742.
86. Id.
87. United States v. Huie, 593 F.2d 14, 15 (5th Cir. 1979).
88. Tyler v. Berodt, 877 F.2d 705, 706–07 (8th Cir. 1989) (discussing situation in which officers
intercepted a conversation on a portable phone using a radio).
89. See, e.g., United States v. Carpenter, 819 F.3d 880, 883 (6th Cir. 2016); United States v.
Graham, Nos. 12-4659, 12-4825, 2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 9797, at *13 (4th Cir. May 31, 2016)
(holding that 200 days’ worth of CSLI was available under the third-party doctrine, and thus no
warrant was required); United States v. Davis, 785 F.3d 498, 500 (11th Cir. 2015) (holding the same
for 67 days’ worth of CSLI); In re Application of U.S. for Historical Cell Site Data, 724 F.3d 600,
615 (5th Cir. 2013). Note that some circuits have not reached this conclusion until en banc review.
90. Davis, 785 F.3d at 510.
91. See, e.g., id. (discussing Historical Cell Site Data, 724 F.3d at 613).
92. Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 742–43 (1979).
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consumer is put on notice that telephone companies monitor dialing
activity.93 Thus, even if an individual subjectively believed that dialed
digits were private, that belief would be unreasonable, and under the
Katz test, not protected by the Fourth Amendment.94
By the same logic, users should be aware that a phone company
tracks their location—for example, to impose surcharges for roaming, to
provide directions, or to locate lost or stolen phones. Even if an
individual cell phone user purports not to know that she is tracked, and
thus claims a subjective expectation of privacy, the broad public
awareness of cell phone tracking indicates that there is no reasonable
expectation of privacy. According to the Department of Justice, “‘a
customer’s Fourth Amendment rights are not violated when [a] phone
company reveals to the government its own records that show where a
mobile device placed and received calls.”95
It is unclear whether the third-party doctrine applies to StingRays.96
While cell phone users might know that their phones automatically
transmit a signal, they likely do not know that the government can use a
StingRay to capture that signal without their consent or action.97 Since a
phone user makes no voluntary transmission to a third party under this
analysis, the third-party doctrine would not apply.98
Furthermore, the third-party doctrine itself has come under substantial
criticism—some scholars believe it is outdated in light of modern
technology, and believe that although lower courts are still following the
doctrine, the United States Supreme Court is likely to revisit it.99 The

93. Id.
94. Id. at 743–44.
95. Declan McCullagh, Court Allows Warrantless Cell Location Tracking, CNET NEWS (Sept. 7,
2010, 1:44 PM), http://www.cnet.com/news/court-allows-warrantless-cell-location-tracking/
[https://perma.cc/3SNM-BPD8].
96. See Hardman, supra note 21, at 21.
97. See id.
98. See id. at 22.
99. See, e.g., Orin S. Kerr, The Case for the Third-Party Doctrine, 107 MICH. L. REV. 561, 561
(2009) (defending “the controversial rule that information loses Fourth Amendment protection when
it is knowingly revealed to a third party.”); Hanni Fakhoury, Smith v. Maryland Turns 35, but Its
Health
Is
Declining,
ELECTRONIC
FRONTIER
FOUND.
(June
24,
2014),
https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2014/06/smith-v-maryland-turns-35-its-healths-declining
[https://perma.cc/DKF7-XD9H]; Jenna McLaughlin, Appeals Court Delivers Devastating Blow to
Cellphone-Privacy
Advocates,
THE INTERCEPT
(May 31,
2016,
12:58
PM),
https://theintercept.com/2016/05/31/appeals-court-delivers-devastating-blow-to-cell-phone-privacyadvocates/ [https://perma.cc/4ELP-GC27].
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Fourth Circuit recently noted that the “Supreme Court may in the future
limit, or even eliminate, the third-party doctrine.”100
B.

The Courts Grapple with Technology and the Fourth Amendment

1.

Early United States Supreme Court Cases

There is little United States Supreme Court precedent on cell phones
or on tracking technology, and none indicates how the court would rule
on CSLI.101 The cases relevant to the use of CSLI date back to the
1970s, far before a majority of Americans owned a cell phone.102 In Katz
v. United States, the Court established the contemporary framework for
Fourth Amendment analysis, requiring both a subjective and an
objective expectation of privacy.103 In United States v. Knotts,104 the
Court held that people have no reasonable expectation of privacy on
public roadways.105 In United States v. Karo,106 the Court restricted
Knotts and held that using technology to monitor inside a private
residence, not open to visual surveillance, is a search.107 Recently, the
Court addressed the use of a GPS device in United States v. Jones,108
holding that a warrant was required to place a GPS device on a
defendant’s car because placement of the GPS device was a trespass to
chattels.109 And in Riley v. California,110 the Court required a warrant for
any search of the contents of a cell phone.111 But the Court has yet to
address cell phone metadata or location information.

100. United States v. Graham, Nos. 12-4659, 12-4825, 2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 9797, at *5 (4th
Cir. May 31, 2016).
101. Some of the only examples will be discussed further below: United States v. Jones,
__ U.S. __, 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012) and Riley v. California, __ U.S. __, 134 S. Ct. 2473 (2014).
102. Cell phones were invented in 1973 and weighed 1.1 kilos. Richard Goodwin, The History of
Cell Phones from 1973 to 2008: The Handsets that Made It All Happen, KNOW YOUR MOBILE
(Apr. 16, 2015, 2:15 PM), http://www.knowyourmobile.com/nokia/nokia-3310/19848/historymobile-phones-1973-2008-handsets-made-it-all-happen [https://perma.cc/S7MW-UADE].
103. 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967).
104. 460 U.S. 276 (1983).
105. See id. at 281–82.
106. 468 U.S. 705 (1984).
107. See id. at 713–16.
108. 565 U.S. __, 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012).
109. See id. at 949–51.
110. __ U.S. __, 134 S. Ct. 2473 (2014).
111. See id. at 2495.

14 - Danelo.docx (Do Not Delete)

1368

10/4/2016 5:13 PM

WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 91:1355

In Katz v. United States, the United States Supreme Court provided a
test to determine whether a search requiring a warrant has taken place.112
Justice Harlan’s concurrence set forth what has become the traditional
two-prong test.113 The first prong is whether a person has shown “an
actual (subjective) expectation of privacy,” and the second is whether
that expectation is “one that society is prepared to recognize as
‘reasonable.’”114 Katz thus expanded Fourth Amendment protections
from a given place—the home—to other aspects of an individual’s life.
Furthermore, Katz reduced Fourth Amendment protection of the home,
holding that “[w]hat a person knowingly exposes to the public, even in
his own home or office, is not a subject of Fourth Amendment
protection.”115
Technology-aided surveillance of people in public places is not a
Fourth Amendment search.116 In United States v. Knotts, the Court found
that police use of a radio transmitter to track the movement of a
defendant’s car on public roads was not a violation of the Fourth
Amendment because “[a] person traveling in an automobile on public
thoroughfares has no reasonable expectation of privacy in his
movements from one place to another.”117
However, the Court limited Knotts to its facts in United States v.
Karo, where law enforcement used a radio transmitter to track
defendant’s movement inside a private home.118 The Court distinguished
this from the actions of the agents in Knotts, who stopped tracking when
the transmitter reached its destination.119 The Court limited the
government to information that could be obtained “by observation from

112. 389 U.S. 347, 360–61 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring) (holding that the government’s
recording of conversations in a public telephone booth merited Fourth Amendment protection). See
also Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 739–40 (1979).
113. See Katz, 389 U.S. at 361.
114. Id.
115. See id. at 351 (citing Lewis v. United States, 385 U.S. 206, 210 (1966); United States v. Lee,
274 U.S. 559, 563 (1927)).
116. See United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 282 (1983) (“Nothing in the Fourth
Amendment prohibited the police from augmenting the sensory faculties bestowed upon them at
birth with such enhancement as science and technology afforded them.”).
117. See id. at 281. Thus, a beeper that agents placed in a container of chemicals and used to track
the suspect was acceptable. See id. at 277, 285.
118. 468 U.S. 705, 708–10, 713–15 (1984).
119. See id. at 714–15.
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outside the curtilage of the house.”120 The use of a radio transmitter,
then, requires a warrant only when it implicates private areas.121
In Kyllo v. United States, the Court found that the use of senseenhancing technology “not in general public use” was a search under the
Fourth Amendment.122 The sense-enhancing technology in question in
Kyllo was heat imaging, which allowed police to see that a wall of
Kyllo’s home was emitting abnormally high amounts of heat, indicating
a marijuana grow operation.123 Like heat imaging, a StingRay could also
be considered sense-enhancing technology: while heat imaging obviates
the need for police to use more labor-intensive methods of detecting
heat, StingRays reduce the need for physically tailing suspects. But the
speed at which technology advances and becomes widely available casts
doubt on the scope of society’s actual expectations of privacy. For
example, the heat-imager at question in Kyllo can now be inexpensively
obtained online by the general public, which fulfills the Court’s “in
general public use” dicta.124
This line of cases demonstrates that the United States Supreme Court
precedent has not kept pace with rapidly evolving modern technology.
Knotts and Karo established a distinction between public and private
places; Kyllo only applies as long as the technology is not widely
available for public purchase; and Katz is difficult to reconcile with a
quickly changing concept of privacy.
2.

The Judicial Shift

a.

United States v. Jones: the Trespass to Chattels Theory

Recent United States Supreme Court decisions have broached issues
of technology and their effects on privacy. The Court makes clear that
“[a]t bottom, [the Court] must ‘assur[e] preservation of that degree of
privacy against government that existed when the Fourth Amendment
was adopted.’”125 Drawing an analogy to now-ancient technology, in

120. See id. at 715.
121. See id.; Knotts, 460 U.S. at 281, 284.
122. 533 U.S. 27, 34 (2001).
123. See id. at 29–30.
124. The Flir One, among many products of its kind available, costs $249.99 as of the editing of
this Note, attaches to a smartphone, and is widely available online. See, e.g., FLIR,
http://www.flir.com/flirone/display/?id=69324 [https://perma.cc/B9NN-CM84].
125. United States v. Jones, __ U.S. __, 132 S. Ct. 945, 950 (2012) (quoting Kyllo, 533 U.S. at
34).
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United States v. Jones126 the Court found that a GPS device placed in a
vehicle was akin to an eighteenth-century constable hiding in a horsedrawn carriage.127 Both are unlawful trespasses to property, and thus
unlawful searches.128 But Jones departed from the Katz reasonable
expectation of privacy test that the Court used exclusively for decades,
instead deciding the GPS issue on a trespass-to-chattels theory.129 This
allowed the Court to sidestep addressing whether a warrant is required
for GPS tracking outside of a suspect’s home: we only know that a
warrant is required if the GPS device interferes with a suspect’s property
rights.130
Because Jones was decided on a trespass-to-chattels theory outside of
the Fourth Amendment framework established by the Court in Katz, its
holding is unhelpful when analyzing whether a warrant is required for
CSLI. Although the Court previously found that use of technology
widely available to the public may not be a search requiring a warrant,131
it sidestepped that question entirely in Jones.132
The lower court in Jones established the mosaic theory, which is
popular among those who believe a full warrant should be required for
CSLI tracking.133 Under the mosaic theory, even if a particular act of
surveillance would be permissible under the Fourth Amendment, it may
violate a suspect’s reasonable expectation of privacy when used longterm, since the aggregate information allows the government to infer
intimate details about a suspect’s life.134 Under this theory, the D.C.
Circuit found that a month of warrantless GPS surveillance violated the
suspect’s Fourth Amendment rights.135 And after Jones, lower courts

126. __ U.S. __, 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012).
127. See id. at 951 n.3.
128. See id.
129. See id. at 949–51. Jones additionally distinguished itself from Knotts on two grounds. First,
Knotts did not claim any physical trespass, whereas Jones did. See id. at 951–52. Second, the Jones
Court stated that the Katz test is not exclusive, and therefore, even if a technique does not constitute
a search under Katz, it might still qualify under the trespass test. See id. at 952–55.
130. See id. at 953–54. From Kyllo, we know that tracking movements through GPS is a search if
it shows details inside the home. Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 42 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
131. Thus, if the general public had a certain device that permitted intrusion into a person’s
private space, no warrant would be required for law enforcement’s use of that device.
132. See Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 957–64 (Alito, J., concurring).
133. See generally, Gabriel R. Schlabach, Note, Privacy in the Cloud: The Mosaic Theory and
the Stored Communications Act, 67 STAN. L. REV. 677 (2015).
134. Id. at 678–79.
135. United States v. Maynard, 615 F.3d 544, 563 (D.C. Cir. 2010); cf. Halkin v. Helms, 598 F.2d
1, 8 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (holding that intelligence agencies should be not required to disclose
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have held that prolonged warrantless searches violate the Fourth
Amendment.136 But the United States Supreme Court has not adopted the
mosaic theory—the closest the Court came to acknowledging the theory
was in the Jones concurrences.137 Justice Sotomayor noted that longterm GPS monitoring can create a “precise, comprehensive record” of a
person’s movements that reveals a “wealth of detail” about that
individual, and should require a full warrant.138 Justice Alito, joined by
Justices Ginsburg, Breyer, and Kagan, noted that the issue the Court
should have addressed was the duration of the tracking, echoing Justice
Sotomayor’s concerns.139
Lower courts have failed to adopt a consistent rationale for Jones’
application to CSLI. United States v. Sereme140 denied a motion to
suppress CSLI under the SCA post-Jones, holding that without the
physical intrusion present in Jones, there was no unlawful search: “the
Jones opinion does nothing to preclude the Government’s monitoring of
individuals through the use of cell site technology.” 141 United States v.
Graham142 did the same, categorizing CSLI as voluntary “business
records . . . created and maintained by the cellular providers.”143 Graham
required only a reasonable suspicion standard of “specific and
articulable facts” for CSLI.144 United States v. Skinner145 saw CSLI as an
essential investigative tool too valuable to law enforcement to limit with
a warrant requirement.146 The Skinner court also found “no inherent
constitutional difference between trailing a defendant and tracking him
“seemingly innocuous information” since those “bits and pieces” can be added together to reveal
“how the unseen whole must operate”).
136. See, e.g., the panel opinions in Davis and Graham, both of which followed the Mosaic
theory. United States v. Graham, 796 F.3d 332 (4th Cir. 2015); United States v. Davis, 754 F.3d
1205 (11th Cir. 2014).
137. See Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 954–57 (J. Sotomayor, concurring); id. at 957–59 (J. Alito,
concurring).
138. Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 955 (J. Sotomayor, concurring); see also Schlabach, supra note 133, at
679.
139. See Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 957–58 (J. Alito, concurring).
140. No. 2:11-CR-97-FtM-29SPC, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 68202 (M.D. Fla. Mar. 26, 2012).
141. Id. at *29–30.
142. 846 F. Supp. 2d 384 (D. Md. 2012), aff’d. by United States v. Graham, 2016 U.S. App.
LEXIS 9797 (4th Cir. May 31, 2016).
143. Id. at 398. The court noted, however, that CSLI, unlike business records which are
“voluntary commercial transactions,” records “transmissions of radio signals in which the cell
phone service subscriber may or may not be an active and voluntary participant.” Id. at 35657.
144. See id. at 386–87.
145. 690 F.3d 772 (6th Cir. 2012).
146. See id. at 774.
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via [CSLI].”147 The Fifth Circuit characterized CSLI as a “record[] of
transactions to which [the cell phone provider] is a party.” Thus, no
warrant is required, provided that the government does not obtain
communication content.148 The Fifth Circuit distinguished Jones and
Karo from CSLI cases by asking who collected the location
information.149 In Jones and Karo, the government collected location
information, while the service provider collected CSLI.150 These cases
illustrate that while Jones could be interpreted to limit the government’s
power to track individuals, different courts interpret Jones differently
when determining the standard required for CSLI.
Although Jones indicates the Court’s awareness of tracking devices, it
provides no clear standard that courts can apply to later tracking cases.
While both GPS and CSLI provide a person’s location, a suspect being
“tracked surreptitiously with a GPS device has no knowledge” of the
location recording, whereas a cell phone user knows that in order to use
the phone, that phone must be connected to the cellular network.151
Additionally, because Jones was decided based on a trespass theory
instead of under the Katz test, its logical extension to CSLI, which does
not involve physical trespass, is weakened.152
b.

Riley v. California: Warrant Requirement for Cell Phone Contents

When police search the contents of a suspect’s phone, even one seized
incident to arrest, they conduct a Fourth Amendment search.153 Chief
Justice Roberts stated Riley’s holding bluntly: “[o]ur answer to the
question of what police must do before searching a cell phone seized
incident to an arrest is accordingly simple—get a warrant.”154
In Riley v. California, the Court unanimously held that police could
not conduct a warrantless search of the contents of a cell phone seized
incident to arrest absent exigent circumstances.155 The key issue in Riley
147. Id. at 778.
148. In re Application of the United States for Historical Cell Site Data, 724 F.3d 600, 612 (5th
Cir. 2013).
149. See id. at 609.
150. Id. at 60910. Note that this analysis does not apply to StingRays, which are devices the
government uses to collect location information.
151. Elizabeth Elliott, Comment, United States v. Jones: The (Hopefully Temporary) Derailment
of Cell-Site Location Information Protection, 15 LOY. J. PUB. INT. L. 1, 8 (2013).
152. See id. at 9; United States v. Jones, __ U.S. __, 132 S. Ct. 945, 954 (2012).
153. Riley v. California, __ U.S. __, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2495 (2014).
154. Id. at 2495.
155. Id. at 2493–95.
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was whether the search-incident-to-arrest exception, which permits
police to seize and search anything found in an arrestee’s possession,
extended to files stored on a cell phone.156 Riley found that it did not,
stating that cell phones are in effect digital containers with “immense
storage capacity” for private data,157 and accordingly “implicate privacy
concerns far beyond those implicated by the search of a cigarette pack, a
wallet or a purse.”158
The Riley Court considered two cases presenting a “common
question.”159 In the first, the police arrested David Riley after
discovering firearms hidden under the hood of his car.160 Upon searching
Riley incident to arrest, the police found evidence that Riley was
associated with a gang.161 The police then seized and searched Riley’s
cell phone without a warrant, finding further evidence of Riley’s gang
affiliation.162 The trial court judge found that the search of the cell phone
was admissible because it was conducted incident to arrest.163 Based in
part on the evidence from Riley’s cell phone, he was convicted of
attempted murder, assault with a semiautomatic firearm, and shooting at
an occupied vehicle.164
In the second case, Brima Wurie was arrested shortly after dealing
drugs outside a convenience store.165 Officers took Wurie’s cell phone
and observed several missed calls from “my house.”166 Without a
warrant, officers flipped open the phone, noted the caller’s number, and
tracked that number back to Wurie’s home.167 After obtaining a search
warrant for the home, officers found large quantities of drugs, a gun, and
cash.168 The district court found that the cell phone search was
constitutional, since it occurred incident to arrest.169 Wurie was charged
with, and subsequently convicted of, felony possession of a firearm and

156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.

See generally Riley, 134 S. Ct. 2473.
Id. at 2489.
Id. at 2488–89.
Id. at 2480.
People v. Riley, No. D059840, 2013 WL 475242, at *1 (Cal. Ct. App. Feb. 8, 2013).
Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2480.
Id.
Riley, 2013 WL 475242, at *3.
Id. at *1.
United States v. Wurie, 612 F. Supp. 2d 104, 106 (D. Mass. 2009).
Id.
Id. at 106–07.
Id. at 107.
Id. at 109–11.
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ammunition, distribution of crack cocaine, and possession of crack
cocaine with intent to distribute.170 In both cases, the convictions were
overturned.171
One of the most significant principles from the Court’s decision in
Riley is that “digital is different, and the difference matters.”172 Chief
Justice Roberts discussed privacy interests, positing that cell phones may
provide “detailed information about all aspects of a person’s life.”173 The
type and quantity of information on a phone can present a significant
privacy intrusion.174 Phones are like “minicomputers” with telephone
capability, collecting various details about a person’s life that may tell
“more in combination than any single record.”175 “Cell phones differ in
both a quantitative and a qualitative sense from other objects that might
be kept on an arrestee’s person.”176 For the above reasons, searching cell
phone data is “materially indistinguishable” from a physical search.177
Like Jones, Riley was a “rather unusual excursus” in the Court’s
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.178 The Riley decision may have
turned on “the justices’ own sense of what is intuitively private.”179 The
Court provided an “indeterminate reasonableness test” which barely
figures in search-incident-to-arrest precedent.180 Indeed, “in case after
case, the Roberts Court has liquidated bright-line rules about when a
search is unreasonable” in favor of reasonableness balancing.181 This
marks the Court’s turn towards “reasonableness” as the “dominant mode
of [Fourth Amendment] constitutional inquiry.”182
170. Id. at 105; Riley v. California, 573 U.S. __, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2482 (2014).
171. Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2495.
172. Brianne J. Gorod, Agreement at the Supreme Court: The Three Important Principles
Underlying Riley v. California, 9 N.Y.U. J. L. & LIBERTY 70, 75 (2015).
173. Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2490.
174. Id. at 2489–91.
175. Charles D. Weisselberg, Cell Phones and Everything Else: Criminal Law Cases in the
Supreme Court’s 2013–2014 Term, 50 CT. REV. 164, 164–65 (2014).
176. Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2489.
177. Id. at 2488.
178. See Noah Feldman, Justices Don’t Want their Smartphones Searched, BLOOMBERG VIEW
(June 25, 2014, 11:24 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/view/articles/2014-06-25/justices-don-twant-their-smartphones-searched [https://perma.cc/P397-9C73?type=image].
179. Id.
180. Fourth Amendment—Search and Seizure—Searching Cell Phones Incident to Arrest—Riley
v. California, 128 HARV. L. REV. 251, 255–56 (2014) [hereinafter Fourth Amendment—Search and
Seizure].
181. Id. at 257.
182. Id.; see Maryland v. King, __ U.S. __, 133 S. Ct. 1958 (2013) (holding the government may
reasonably collect arrestees’ DNA without a warrant or individualized suspicion); Florence v. Bd. of
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The Riley Court, eager to find a middle ground but unable to do so,
settled for the clarity of requiring a warrant.183 The Justices’ desire for a
moderate approach is reflected by the Court’s “handwringing about the
lack of limiting principles” as well as the Justices’ repeated demands for
an in-between rule during oral arguments.184 In their separate opinions,
Justices Roberts and Alito emphasized that courts should construe Riley
narrowly, and Justice Alito noted that he did not see a “workable
alternative” to the majority’s rule.185 Thus, in one reading, Riley may
indicate that the Court is adapting to the times and will not blindly apply
law from an earlier age to today’s digital media.186 By another reading,
although Riley itself was a victory for privacy advocates, the Court is
unlikely to be as solicitous about defendants’ rights in future cases
relying on the reasonableness approach, because the facts in Riley were
particularly favorable to the defendants.187 Lacking a more moderate
solution, the Riley court favored clarity because bright-line rules are
particularly valuable for law enforcement: per Alito’s concurrence,
“[l]aw enforcement officers need clear rules regarding searches incident
to arrest.”188
Riley’s reasoning clears the way for even more doctrinal change.
“[L]ower courts are on notice” that they should not readily “follow
broad statements from pre-digital opinions, even if those opinions
emanated from the Supreme Court itself.”189 In his concurrence in Riley,
Justice Alito noted that “we should not mechanically apply the rule used
in the predigital era to the search of a cell phone” and that modern

Chosen Freeholders, __ U.S. __, 132 S. Ct. 1510, 1520–23 (2012) (finding that an extensive strip
search of all new detainees regardless of the severity of their infractions was reasonable).
183. Fourth Amendment—Search and Seizure, supra note 180, at 259.
184. Id. at 259–60; see also S.M., There’s No App for That, THE ECONOMIST (Apr. 30, 2014, 2:01
PM), http://www.economist.com/blogs/democracyinamerica/2014/04/mobile-phone-privacy [https:
//perma.cc/X7LK-GS8F]. In oral arguments, the Justices repeatedly demanded an “in-between
rule.” Transcript of Oral Argument at 38, Riley v. California, __ U.S. __, 134 S. Ct. 2473 (2014)
(No. 13-132) (Breyer, J.), http://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/13132_h315.pdf [https://perma.cc/D4W9-XZ84] (citing Fourth Amendment—Search and Seizure,
supra note 180).
185. Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2497 (Alito, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
186. Michael D. Ricciuti & Kathleen D. Parker, My Phone Is My Castle: Supreme Court Decides
That Cell Phones Seized Incident to Arrest Cannot Be Subject to Routine Warrantless Searches, 58
B.B.J. 7, 9 (2014).
187. Fourth Amendment—Search and Seizure, supra note 180, at 260.
188. Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2497 (Alito, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
189. Richard Re, Symposium: Inaugurating the Digital Fourth Amendment, SCOTUS BLOG (June
26, 2014, 12:37 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2014/06/symposium-inaugurating-the-digitalfourth-amendment/ [https://perma.cc/GV3D-9PA6?type=image].
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technology “calls for a new balancing of law enforcement and privacy
interests.”190
In this vein, the Court rejected the government’s reliance on the thirdparty doctrine’s seminal case, Smith v. Maryland.191 Whereas in Smith,
no Fourth Amendment search occurred, here the Court found there was a
physical search.192 The Court additionally refused to permit searches of
cell phone data even if law enforcement could have obtained the same
information from a pre-digital counterpart, such as a personal journal,
found during a search incident to arrest.193 The third-party doctrine is
decades old, and in the light of changing technology, the Court may
overrule or substantially modify it.194 Yet to date, the third-party
doctrine stands.195 In fact, it is the authority under which law
enforcement is gaining access to CSLI.196
Riley has not produced clarity in the circuit courts on the question of
whether a warrant is required to obtain CSLI.197 Until recently, there was
a circuit split, with the Fourth Circuit holding that a warrant was
required and the Fifth, Sixth, and Eleventh Circuits holding that no
warrant was necessary, as CSLI is information shared with a third
party.198 Indeed, “CSLI does not comfortably fit into any Fourth
Amendment line of cases: it is difficult to simply label the data ‘records’
under the assumption of risk doctrine, or to call a cell phone just a
tracking device under Knotts or Karo.”199 Riley “did not address whether
190. Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2496–97 (Alito, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
191. Id. at 2492–93.
192. Id. (comparing Wurie’s case with the facts in Smith and finding that while Smith “concluded
that the use of a pen register was not a ‘search’ at all under the Fourth Amendment . . . . There is no
dispute here that the officers engaged in a search of Wurie’s cell phone.”) (citations omitted).
193. Id.
194. Jeremy H. Rothstein, Note, Track Me Maybe: The Fourth Amendment and the Use of Cell
Phone Tracking to Facilitate Arrest, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 489, 506 (2012).
195. See, e.g., United States v. Graham, 796 F.3d 332 (4th Cir. 2015), rev’d en banc United
States v. Graham, Nos. 12-4659, 12-4825, 2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 9797, *4 (4th Cir. May 31, 2016)
(holding that the government’s acquisition of historical CSLI from defendants’ cell phone provider
did not violate the Fourth Amendment).
196. Id.
197. Cf. United States v. Davis, 785 F.3d 498, 500 (11th Cir. 2015) (holding that a court order
compelling the production of a third-party telephone company’s business records containing CSLI
did not violate the defendant’s Fourth Amendment rights); Graham, 796 F.3d at 338 (holding that
the government’s warrantless procurement of CSLI was an unreasonable search in violation of the
Fourth Amendment).
198. C.f. United States v. Carpenter, 819 F.3d 880, 883 (6th Cir. 2016); Davis, 785 F.3d at 500;
Graham, 796 F.3d at 338; In re Application of U.S. for Historical Cell Site Data, 724 F.3d 600, 615
(5th Cir. 2013).
199. Elliott, supra note 151, at 15.
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the Fourth Amendment applies to remote intrusions of a cell phone, such
as the collection of metadata.”200 In Riley, the Court “gingerly skirted the
legal morass” posed by metadata.201 It is unclear how Riley’s concerns
for privacy can be reconciled with the Court’s trespass theory from
Jones, and it thus remains uncertain whether expectations of privacy
diminish when the government remotely tracks information.202
Justice Sotomayor touched on metadata in her aforementioned Jones
concurrence,203 noting that long-term location monitoring can
reconstruct someone’s specific movements precisely, resulting in a level
of information that police would typically need a warrant to obtain:
“GPS monitoring generates a precise, comprehensive record of a
person’s public movements that reflects a wealth of detail about her
familial, political, professional, religious, and sexual associations.”204
Justice Sotomayor’s concurrence indicates that she is inclined to require
law enforcement to show at least reasonable suspicion before tracking
CSLI.205 Nevertheless, the Court found the vast personal information
available in a cell phone seized incident to arrest to be distinguishable
from metadata: location does not provide information about a user’s
applications, photos, or web browsing history. Until the Court addresses
the issue, we must look to lower courts and legislatures to find a balance
between law enforcement and privacy interests.
c.

How the Circuit Courts Have Treated CSLI

The enhanced protections Riley afforded cell phone contents have not
translated to protections for CSLI in the lower courts. The Fourth, Fifth,

200. Adam Lamparello & Charles E. MacLean, Riley v. California: Privacy Still Matters, But
How Much and in What Contexts?, 27 REGENT U. L. REV. 25, 28 (2014).
201. Fourth Amendment—Search and Seizure, supra note 187, at 253 n.31.
202. Lamparello & MacLean, supra note 200, at 36.
203. See supra section II.B.2.
204. Riley v. California, __ U.S. __, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2490 (2014) (citing United States v. Jones,
__ U.S. __, 132 S. Ct. 945, 955 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring)).
205. See, e.g., Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21 (1968) (establishing the reasonable suspicion
standard, which requires law enforcement “to point to specific and articulable facts which, taken
together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant that intrusion”). Several
scholars indicate that reasonable suspicion is sufficient for the government to gather metadata. See
Adam Lamparello & Charles MacLean, Riley v. California: The New Katz or Chimel?, 21 RICH. J.
L. & TECH. 1, 23 (2014); Lamparello & MacLean, supra note 200, at 27 (asserting that government
monitoring of calls or location is only acceptable if government has “good reason . . . often referred
to as probable cause or reasonable suspicion”).
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Sixth, and Eleventh Circuits do not require a warrant for CSLI, finding
that it falls under the third-party doctrine.206
In United States v. Davis, the Eleventh Circuit held that law
enforcement may obtain historical cell site location information without
a search warrant, because:
Cell tower location records do not contain private
communications of the subscriber. This type of non-content
evidence, lawfully created by a third party telephone company
for legitimate business purposes, does not belong to [defendant],
even if it concerns him . . . . [m]ore importantly, like the bank
customer in Miller and the phone customer in Smith, Davis has
no subjective or objective reasonable expectation of privacy[.]207
After a two-month string of robberies leading to Davis’s arrest,
prosecutors obtained a court order under the SCA for his cell location
records during the relevant period.208 The prosecution introduced these
location records at trial, which only tracked Davis to the nearest mile at
any given time yet still linked Davis to six of the seven armed robberies
for which he stood trial.209 Davis appealed his conviction, arguing that a
warrant should have been required for the cell location records.210
The Eleventh Circuit’s three-judge panel found that the government’s
warrantless gathering of CSLI violated Davis’s reasonable expectation
of privacy under the Fourth Amendment.211 The en banc panel
disagreed, holding that Davis’s phone records were indeed third party
records for which no warrant was required.212
The court distinguished Davis from Jones and Katz.213 Unlike in
Jones, in Davis the government neither used a GPS device nor
physically trespassed.214 Unlike in Katz, where the government recorded
conversations without a warrant, in Davis the government did not record
any conversations.215 Furthermore, Davis did not fulfill the Katz test:
206. United States v. Graham, Nos. 12-4659, 12-4825, 2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 9797 (4th Cir.
May 31, 2016); United States v. Carpenter, 819 F.3d 880, 883 (6th Cir. 2016); United States v.
Davis, 785 F.3d 498, 500 (11th Cir. 2015); In re Application of the United States for Historical Cell
Site Data, 724 F.3d 600, 615 (5th Cir. 2013).
207. Davis, 785 F.3d at 528–29.
208. Id. at 502.
209. Id. at 503–04.
210. Id. at 504–05.
211. United States v. Davis, 754 F.3d 1205, 1217 (11th Cir. 2014).
212. Davis, 785 F.3d at 518.
213. Id. at 505.
214. Id.
215. Id. at 507 (citing United States v. Katz, 389 U.S. 347, 354–56 (1967)).
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Davis had no reasonable expectation of privacy in his phone records
since cell phone users are aware that phone companies track their
locations.216 Addressing Riley, the Eleventh Circuit found that cell phone
location information is categorically different from the cell phone
contents at question in Riley.217 Additionally, the Davis court notes that
the Riley court “made a special point of stressing that the facts before it
‘do not implicate the question whether the collection or inspection of
aggregated digital information amounts to a search under other
circumstances’”—i.e. that Riley did not address the mosaic theory.218
The Eleventh Circuit found that changing technology should not be
afforded any special considerations under the third-party doctrine:
If our expectation of privacy in our personal communications
has not changed from what it was when we only wrote letters to
what it is now that we use telephones to conduct our personal
interactions, it has not changed just because we now happen to
use email to personally communicate.219
The court did not require a warrant for Davis’s CSLI, finding that
Davis’s phone records fell under the third-party doctrine.220 Although a
circuit split existed at the time, the United States Supreme Court denied
certiorari to Davis.221
The Fourth Circuit tracks the Eleventh: as in Davis, in Graham the
three-judge panel ruled that a warrant was required for CSLI, but the en
banc court overturned that decision.222 The panel in Graham relied on
the mosaic theory to find that, although a single CSLI data point does
not constitute a search, a large number of data points (here, 221 days’
worth) does.223 This opinion created a circuit split between the Fifth,
Sixth, and Eleventh Circuits (holding no warrant required for CSLI) and
the Fourth Circuit (holding until recently that a warrant was required for
216. Id. at 511. (“[C]ell users know that they must transmit signals to cell towers within range,
that the cell tower functions as the equipment that connects the calls, that users when making or
receiving calls are necessarily conveying or exposing to their service provider their general location
within that cell tower’s range, and that cell phone companies make records of cell-tower usage.”).
217. Id. at 516 n.19.
218. Id. (citing Riley v. California, __ U.S. __, 134 S. Ct. 2473 (2014)). The Eleventh Circuit
additionally noted that “[i]t is not helpful to lump together doctrinally unrelated cases that happen to
involve similar modern technology.” Id.
219. Id. at 528–29.
220. Id.
221. Davis, 785 F.3d 498 (11th Cir. 2015), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 479 (2015).
222. United States v. Graham, 796 F.3d 332 (4th Cir. 2015), rev’d en banc, United States v.
Graham, Nos. 12-4659, 12-4825, 2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 9797 (4th Cir. May 31, 2016).
223. Graham, 796 F.3d at 347–349.
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CSLI).224 But the Graham en banc panel found that CSLI falls under the
third-party doctrine and held that no warrant was required since law
enforcement had obtained a court order under the SCA.225 The en banc
decision noted, however, that the United States Supreme Court may
overrule the third-party doctrine, as discussed in Section II.A.226
The Fifth Circuit similarly found that a court order under the SCA
was adequate for CSLI.227 The Fifth Circuit held that “orders to obtain
historical cell site information for specified cell phones at the points at
which the user places and terminates a call are not categorically
unconstitutional.”228 It also found that historical CSLI is not subject to a
reasonable expectation of privacy because users knowingly expose this
information to cell providers.229
Citing Justice Alito’s concurrence in Jones, the Fifth Circuit noted
that “[a] legislative body is well situated to gauge changing public
attitudes, to draw detailed lines, and to balance privacy and public safety
in a comprehensive way.”230 The court additionally noted that “Congress
has crafted such a legislative solution in the SCA,” and that the SCA
“conforms to existing Supreme Court Fourth Amendment
precedent.”231 Thus, the court “decline[d] to create a new rule to
hold that Congress’s balancing of privacy and safety is
unconstitutional.”232
The Sixth Circuit has ruled that real-time tracking using GPS data
from a suspect’s cell phone does not implicate the Fourth Amendment
when the tracking lasts only a few days—a question left open by
Jones.233 The Skinner court found that police use of CSLI to track a

224. C.f. United States v. Carpenter, 819 F.3d 880, 888 (6th Cir. 2016); Graham, 796 F.3d at
347–49; Davis, 785 F.3d at 511–13; In re Application of U.S. for Historical Cell Site Data, 724 F.3d
600, 615 (5th Cir. 2013).
225. See generally Graham, 796 F.3d 332, rev’d en banc, United States v. Graham, Nos. 124659, 12-4825, 2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 9797 (4th Cir. May 31, 2016).
226. Id., 2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 9797, at *5–6.
227. Historical Cell Site Data, 724 F.3d at 611–15.
228. Id. at 615 (emphasis omitted).
229. Id. at 613, 615 (noting that users likely do not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in
their cell location information). See also United States v. Guerrero, 768 F.3d 351, 360–61 (5th Cir.
2014) (noting that the academic debate created post-Riley does not affect lower court precedent,
under which CSLI still falls under the third party doctrine).
230. Historical Cell Site Data, 724 F.3d at 614 (quoting United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945,
964 (2012) (Alito, J., concurring)).
231. Id.
232. Id. at 615.
233. United States v. Skinner, 690 F.3d 772 (6th Cir. 2012).
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defendant’s movements along public highways did not violate the Fourth
Amendment because individuals have no reasonable expectation of
privacy in their public movements.234 Furthermore, the court compared a
cell phone that has tracking capabilities to the location beeper that law
enforcement planted in a barrel of ether in Karo—in both cases,
defendants obtained the object with a tracking device already present.235
Because the defendant voluntarily purchased a phone with tracking, he
eroded his own reasonable expectation of privacy; thus, the police could
use those tracking capabilities to track him along public roads.236
Unlike the topic of CSLI use, there are few cases involving use of
StingRays.237 Although there was speculation that the United States
Supreme Court would grant certiorari to the Davis case in order to
follow Riley with a decision on metadata, the Court denied certiorari—as
in Jones, sidestepping the issue.238 Both courts and privacy advocates
assert that technology has ushered civil liberties into the virtual world,
and the law must adapt by “providing legal protections to individuals
who speak, associate, and assemble in that world.”239 Since existing
jurisprudence leaves that question open, and a circuit split no longer
exists to increase the likelihood of United States Supreme Court review,
this Note seeks to show how to afford adequate legal protections to
individuals in the absence of United States Supreme Court action.

234. Id. at 778.
235. Id. at 781 (citing United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705 (1984)).
236. Id. at 777.
237. Another relevant decision notable only for the confusion it lends is the Third Circuit’s
opinion concluding that historical location information generally may be obtained without a search
warrant but that a court could require a warrant under some circumstances. See In re United States
for an Order Directing Provider of Elec. Commc’n. Serv. to Disclose Records to the Gov’t, 620 F.3d
304 (3d Cir. 2010).
238. Mary-Elizabeth M. Hadley, A Circuit Split Emerges: At Least for Now, the Protection
Afforded to Cell Location Information Depends on Where You Are, CAVEAT VENDOR BLOG (Aug.
10, 2015), http://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=f9fa2829-d608-474e-a525-085b1cceb74c
[https://perma.cc/29C7-3XP7]; Editor’s Blog, Circuit Split: Eleventh Circuit Creates Division on
Standard to Obtain Cell Site Location Information, FED. EVID. REV. (June 19, 2014),
http://federalevidence.com/blog/2014/june/circuit-split-eleventh-circuit-creates-division-standardobtain-cell-site-location-in [https://perma.cc/4FVD-N8JP].
239. Lamparello & MacLean, supra note 208, at 20.

14 - Danelo.docx (Do Not Delete)

1382

10/4/2016 5:13 PM

WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 91:1355

III. LEGISLATIVE SUPPLEMENTATION OF JUDICIAL
STANDARDS
Following the Court’s decisions establishing the third-party
doctrine,240 Congress enacted federal legislation that goes above the
constitutional baseline in protecting communications.241 Title III, the
SCA, and the Pen/Trap statute are examples of when Congress has
stepped in to supplement the Court’s Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.
These federal statutes prescribe protections for various technologyrelated searches. Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets
Act of 1968 regulates wiretapping and eavesdropping;242 the SCA
regulates the search and interception of electronic communications;243
and the Pen/Trap Statute regulates the use of pen registers to capture
numbers dialed from a telephone.244
Title III, enacted in the wake of the Court’s decisions in Katz and
Berger, regulates nonconsensual interception of oral, wire, or electronic
communications.245 Most states have enacted additional statutes
subsequent to Title III.246 Title III was written to provide uniform rules
for law enforcement engaging in wiretapping or eavesdropping, to
comply with United States Supreme Court precedent, and to protect the
privacy of communications.247 It includes procedural and substantive
safeguards that surpass constitutional requirements.248 In addition, Title
III requires that law enforcement have not only probable cause to obtain
a wiretap, but also particularization of the person and place to be
wiretapped, as well as limitations on time and types of conversations to
be seized.249
The SCA regulates government access to the contents of electronic
communications held by third parties, such as phone companies and
internet service providers.250 It is one of the primary mechanisms

240. See supra Part II.A.
241. See generally 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510–2522 (2012); §§ 2701–2712; §§ 3121–3127.
242. §§ 2510–2522.
243. §§ 2701–2712.
244. §§ 3121–3127.
245. See §§ 2510–22.
246. RONALD J. ALLEN ET AL., CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: INVESTIGATION AND RIGHT TO COUNSEL
901 (Wolters Kluwer, 2d ed. 2011).
247. Id. at 901–02.
248. Id.
249. Id.
250. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2701–2712 (2012).
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currently regulating CSLI.251 The SCA criminalizes unauthorized access
to users’ stored communications,252 restricts providers from sharing
those communications,253 and regulates the government’s requests for
data governed by the SCA.254 For non-content information, such as a
user’s account details, address, or credit card number, only a subpoena is
required.255 For transactional records, such as a list of addresses to which
an individual has sent emails or phone numbers an individual has called,
the SCA requires a court order showing “reasonable grounds to believe
that the . . . information sought [is] relevant and material to an ongoing
criminal investigation.”256 This court order is an intermediate evidentiary
standard: lower than the probable cause requirement of a warrant, but
higher than a subpoena.257 Many courts have ruled CSLI accessible with
a court order under the SCA.258 Courts that allow historical CSLI access
under the SCA treat CSLI as a transactional record and require only a
court order.259
The Pen/Trap statute,260 like the SCA, provides “that law enforcement
agencies may record and store indefinitely all of the digits dialed from a
specific telephone without a warrant, without notification to the user,
and without a showing of probable cause.”261 The Pen/Trap Statute
regulates law enforcement’s use of pen registers (which record the phone
numbers a telephone user dials) and trap-and-trace devices (which
perform the opposite function, recording the digits of all incoming calls
to a given telephone).262 Though pen registers were once used only for
telephone communications, they are now used for a variety of electronic
media.263

251. Ross, supra note 32, at 1197.
252. 18 U.S.C. § 2701 (2012).
253. 18 U.S.C. § 2702 (2012).
254. 18 U.S.C. § 2703 (2012).
255. Id.
256. Id.
257. S. REP. NO. 103-402, at 31 (1994).
258. Fraser, supra note 33, at 585.
259. Ross, supra note 32, at 1199.
260. 18 U.S.C. §§ 3121–3127 (2012).
261. Marcus M. Baldwin, Note, Dirty Digits: The Collection of Post-Cut-Through Dialed Digits
Under the Pen/Trap Statute, 74 BROOKLYN L. REV. 1109, 1109 (2009).
262. Id. at 1109 n.3; 18 U.S.C. §§ 3121–3127 (2012) (collectively the “Pen/Trap Statute”). For
the statutory definition of a pen register, see § 3127(3).
263. Baldwin, supra note 261, at 1109.
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In the case of cell phones, pen registers can calculate a user’s physical
location or track their movements in real time.264 Courts have approved
court orders under the Pen/Trap Statute for technology that eavesdrops
on actual phone conversations as well as for technology that monitors
URLs that a suspect visited and addresses he emailed.265 This shows that
the classification of a device as a pen register is “primarily functional”—
use of the statute is not inextricably linked to the use of an actual pen
register.266 But the pen register statute itself mandates that information
gathered “shall not include the contents of any communication . . . .”267
Indeed, courts have found that actual pen registers pose a lesser threat to
privacy than traditional wiretaps because pen registers cannot reveal the
contents of a communication.268 This follows the holding in Smith v.
Maryland that Fourth Amendment protections do not apply to dialed
digits.269 For these reasons, the government has relied on Smith to
support CSLI collection.270
Title III, the SCA, and the Pen/Trap statute show that when Congress
has intervened to provide greater privacy for communications above the
constitutional baseline, it still has not required a warrant for non-content
communication. Instead, Congress requires court orders or subpoenas.
IV. LEGISLATIVE SOLUTIONS FOR CSLI AND STINGRAY USE
Given that law enforcement’s use of CSLI is a controversial and
pressing issue, what should be done about its use? As noted above, the
United States Supreme Court has refrained from addressing the issue of
metadata,271 and the Court recently denied certiorari in a case that would
have resolved the issue of whether warrants are required for CSLI. 272
264. Id. at 1113.
265. People v. Kramer, 706 N.E.2d 731, 737 (N.Y. 1998) (holding that if a device’s digital and
audio functions were “sufficiently discrete” and there was only a remote likelihood of misuse, the
presence of audio-capable technology would not disqualify a device from use as a pen register);
United States v. Forrester, 512 F.3d 500, 504, 510 n.6 (9th Cir. 2008) (holding that a Pen/Trap court
order allowed law enforcement to obtain defendant’s URLs visited and addresses emailed).
266. Baldwin, supra note 261, at 1114.
267. 18 U.S.C. §3127(3). See also § 3121(c), also requiring that no communication contents be
captured.
268. United States v. New York Tel. Co., 434 U.S. 159, 165–68 (1977).
269. Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979); see also Smith v. State, 389 A.2d 858, 868 (Md.
1978) (state court of last resort holding).
270. Laura K. Donohue, Bulk Metadata Collection: Statutory and Constitutional
Considerations, 37 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y. 757, 866–67, 871 (2014).
271. See supra Part II.B.2.ii.
272. See United States v. Davis, 785 F.3d 498 (11th Cir. 2015) (en banc).
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This may indicate that the Court is not ready to address the metadata
issue. Until the Court does, there is no clear rule for how location
information is protected.
In the absence of Court action, a legislative solution is appropriate. In
Riley, Justice Alito made a strong suggestion for legislation in his
concurrence, stating he “would reconsider the question presented here if
either Congress or state legislatures . . . enact legislation that draws
reasonable distinctions . . . .”273 Some courts point out that establishing
“bright-line rules regarding legal protection for . . . CSLI is a task for the
legislature, which is better suited to striking a delicate balance between
the needs of law enforcement and the civil liberties of American
citizens.”274
The legislature is better suited than the courts to solve this issue
because it is not bound by its own precedent; it can better assess facts;
and it can act quickly to reflect the changes and expansions in
technology.275 It is better to formulate privacy law by legislation
because, unlike the courts, legislatures can pass sweeping but intricate
laws.276 While courts are limited to developing rules based on the cases
that come to them, legislatures can tailor laws to a wide range of
circumstances and are not bound by stare decisis.277 Courts adjudicate
past disputes, which means that judicial holdings on issues of technology
or other fast-changing subjects tend to be “outdated on arrival,” whereas
legislatures can simultaneously address both present and future
concerns.278
Historically, congressional action is unlikely: multiple efforts to
regulate CSLI have stalled.279 In 2012 a bipartisan group of Senators
proposed a bill regulating CSLI.280 In 2015, the group reformulated the
273. Riley v. California, __ U.S. __ 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2497 (2014) (Alito, J., concurring).
274. Ross, supra note 32, at 1212, citing In re United States for an Order Authorizing the Release
of Historical Cell-Site Info., 736 F. Supp. 2d 578, 585 (E.D.N.Y. 2010).
275. Orin Kerr, Governor Brown Vetoes Bill on Searching Cell Phones Incident to Arrest,
VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Oct. 10, 2011, 2:39 PM), http://www.volokh.com/2011/10/10/governorbrown-vetoes-bill-on-searching-cell-phones-incident-to-arrest/ [https://perma.cc/7LBF-NMHL].
276. See generally Orin S. Kerr, The Fourth Amendment and New Technologies: Constitutional
Myths and the Case for Caution, 102 MICH. L. REV. 801, 805 (2004).
277. Schlabach, supra note 133, at 699.
278. Id.
279. See Elliott, supra note 151, at 3; Robinson Meyer, Do Police Need a Warrant to See Where
a Phone Is?, THE ATLANTIC (Aug. 8, 2015), http://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/
2015/08/warrantless-cell-phone-location-tracking/400775/ [https://perma.cc/3LT4-LUSR] (“[A]
bipartisan bill about CSLI has lingered in [Congress’] higher chamber for years”).
280. Cybersecurity Act of 2012, S. 3414, 112th Cong. (2012) (amendment proposed by Wyden),
https://www.wyden.senate.gov/download/?id=081B52AA-0F9B-4B5E-88C2-911CF39E6D86
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bill as the Geolocation Privacy and Surveillance Act, which would
require law enforcement to obtain a warrant before acquiring an
individual’s geolocation information.281 Despite these efforts, there is an
intractable debate between privacy advocates and law enforcement over
appropriate legislative reform, which continuously prevents federal
legislation regulating CSLI from passing.282 Thus, the prospect of
congressional action is far from certain.
Since Congress is either unwilling or unable to pass an appropriate
legislative solution, state legislatures should step in. Not only are states
more nimble in addressing the technology questions that paralyze
Congress, they also accommodate differing local tastes for the balance
between privacy and effective law enforcement.283
Furthermore, state legislation is necessary to regulate police policy at
the local level. According to data maintained by the ACLU, there is no
clear consensus among states about how to treat CSLI. 284 Even
individual states have yet to determine statewide StingRay policies: for
example, in Washington State, the Seattle Police Department does not
use StingRays, but the nearby Tacoma Police Department does.285
Federally, the Justice Department and the IRS have recently begun to
require warrants.286 In the absence of Congressional action, state

&download=1 [https://perma.cc/4WBJ-YMCZ]; see also Ron Wyden, Amendments Offered to the
Cybersecurity Act of 2012 (July 30, 2012), https://www.wyden.senate.gov/news/blog/post/
cybersecurity-act-of-2012 [https://perma.cc/GUP5-BYQN].
281. Geological Privacy and Surveillance Act (GPS Act), S. 237, 114th Cong. (2015),
https://www.wyden.senate.gov/priorities/gps-act [https://perma.cc/BSK7-6VAZ].
282. Stephanie K. Pell & Christopher Soghoian, Can You See Me Now?: Toward Reasonable
Standards for Law Enforcement Access to Location Data That Congress Could Enact, 27
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 117, 123–24 (2012).
283. See, e.g., Schlabach, supra note 133, at 699.
284. The status of the law is as follows: no warrant requirement in fourteen states, location
information is unprotected in nineteen states and the District of Columbia, “some protections” in
three states (indicating that “judges have discretion to require warrant for historical CSLI”), and a
warrant required for all cell phone location information in six states. Robinson Meyer, Where
Americans Can Be Tracked Without a Warrant, THE ATLANTIC (Nov. 12, 2015),
http://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2015/11/where-americans-can-be-tracked-withouta-warrant/415461/ [https://perma.cc/K3U8-FR6B].
285. Ansel Herz, Seattle Police Deny Having or Using “Stingray” Data Sucking Device, THE
STRANGER (Aug. 28, 2014, 1:22 PM), http://slog.thestranger.com/slog/archives/2014/08/28/seattlepolice-deny-having-or-using-StingRay-cell-phone-data-sucking-device
[https://perma.cc/84PKYR9X]; Martin, supra note 3.
286. Nicholas Fandos, Justice Dept. to Require Warrants for Some Cellphone Tracking, N.Y.
TIMES (Sept. 3, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/09/04/us/politics/justice-dept-to-requirewarrants-for-some-cellphone-tracking.html [https://perma.cc/VW87-EMES]; Ron Wyden, IRS
Commits to Follow Justice Department Guidelines on StingRays in Letter to Wyden (Dec. 1, 2015),
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legislatures can ensure a clear standard at the local level.287 Some states,
including Washington, have stepped up to the challenge.288
This Note details three separate approaches for potential legislation.
The options are as follows: require no warrant or other judicial approval,
require a court order based on reasonable suspicion, or, the most
protective, require a warrant based on probable cause.
A.

Require No Warrant

As of 2015, seventeen states had not passed legislation that required
any showing of suspicion, through either a court order or a warrant, for
StingRays.289 Without legislation, Americans are limited to the
minimum constitutional protection. The circuit courts that have
addressed this issue require no warrant for CSLI collection: under their
interpretation, CSLI is information voluntarily conveyed to a third
party.290 These courts find that CSLI falls under the third-party doctrine
and therefore is not subject to Fourth Amendment protection.291 Beyond

https://www.wyden.senate.gov/news/press-releases/irs-commits-to-follow-justice-departmentguidelines-on-StingRays-in-letter-to-wyden [https://perma.cc/TND7-ZWD5].
287. Larry Greenemeier, What Is the Big Secret Surrounding StingRay Surveillance? SCI.
AMERICAN (June 25, 2015), http://www.scientificamerican.com/article/what-is-the-big-secretsurrounding-StingRay-surveillance/ [https://perma.cc/856A-9LSS] (“You’re dealing with outdated
statutes concerning new and very different technology. It’s possible in five years maybe that
Congress will step in and do something. More likely, state legislatures will take most of the action
to monitor this type of surveillance. Washington State, California [and others] have already acted,
and Texas is evaluating the standards for approving StingRay use.”).
288. WASH. REV. CODE § 9.73.260 (West 2015).
289. Status of Location Privacy Legislation in the States: 2015, ACLU (Aug. 26, 2015),
https://www.aclu.org/blog/free-future/status-location-privacy-legislation-states-2015
[https://perma.cc/5VB4-QHVV] (discussing relevant legislation in Georgia, Kansas, Mississippi,
Missouri, New York, North Carolina, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South
Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, Vermont, West Virginia and Wisconsin. Currently these states are at a
constitutional minimum, but may soon legislate to provide enhanced constitutional protections, as
this is a quickly changing area of law.).
290. United States v. Graham, Nos. 12-4659, 12-4825, 2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 9797, at *13 (4th
Cir. May 31, 2016) (en banc); United States v. Carpenter, 819 F.3d 880, 888 (6th Cir. 2016); United
States v. Davis, 785 F.3d 498, 511–13 (11th Cir. 2015) (en banc); In re Application of U.S. for
Historical Cell Site Data, 724 F.3d 600, 615 (5th Cir. 2013).
291. See Graham, 2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 9797, at *4 (noting that “[a]ll of our sister circuits to
have considered the question have held, as we do today, that the government does not violate the
Fourth Amendment when it obtains historical CSLI from a service provider without a warrant
[under the third party doctrine].”).
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these circuit court decisions, additional law enforcement departments
currently rely on the third-party doctrine to gather warrantless CSLI.292
The third-party doctrine applies to CSLI under the theory that the cell
phone user voluntarily conveys a phone’s location information to the cell
provider.293 Cell phone users understand that, for billing and general use
purposes, they must convey their location information to the provider.294
This awareness is reflected not only by cell phone bills but also by
common knowledge. Under this interpretation, CSLI is not subject to
constitutional protection.
Proponents of this position argue that cell phone users are readily
aware that their CSLI information is available to others.295 According to
the Pew Research Center, more than half of “app” users have uninstalled
or decided not to install an app due to concerns about their personal
information being shared.296 Additionally, one in five cell phone owners
have turned off the location tracking feature on their phone, and one in
three have cleared their cell phone browsing or search history.297 These
actions indicate that cell phone users know that the government may
collect their information and that they can take steps to protect that
information.298 It is under this rationale that the circuit courts found no
subjective or objective expectation of privacy in CSLI.299
Conversely, the third-party doctrine may not apply to StingRays.
StingRays may not comply with Karo’s enhanced privacy afforded to
the home: “‘[n]o matter how the StingRay is used—to identify, locate or
intercept—they always send signals through the walls of homes,’ which
should trigger a warrant requirement” since the signals “penetrate a

292. See, e.g., Mathew Keys, California Cops Used Stingrays 300 Times Without Warrant, THE
BLOT (May 28, 2015), https://www.theblot.com/report-california-cops-used-stingrays-300-timeswithout-warrant-2-7744246 [https://perma.cc/R4LK-A7BG].
293. Kyle Malone, Comment, The Fourth Amendment and the Stored Communications Act: Why
the Warrantless Gathering of Historical Cell Site Location Information Poses No Threat to Privacy,
39 PEPP. L. REV. 701, 739 (2012).
294. Id.
295. Graham, 2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 9797, at *10–12.
296. Pew Research Center, supra note 15.
297. Id.
298. See
The
Problem
with
Mobile
Phones,
SURVEILLANCE SELF-DEFENSE,
https://ssd.eff.org/en/module/problem-mobile-phones [https://perma.cc/2CUQ-Y99Z] (describing
mobile phone privacy and how to get more of it).
299. Graham, 2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 9797 at *13; United States v. Carpenter, 819 F.3d 880, 888
(6th Cir. 2016); United States v. Davis, 785 F.3d 498, 511–13 (11th Cir. 2015) (en banc); In re
Application of United States for Historical Cell Site Data, 724 F.3d 600, 615 (5th Cir. 2013).
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space protected by the Fourth Amendment.”300 Under this theory, Karo
precludes the third party analysis, since the government cannot use
technology to access information about the inside of a person’s home
without obtaining a warrant.301
B.

Require a Court Order Based on Reasonable Suspicion

While the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, and Eleventh Circuits did not require a
warrant for CSLI, the officers in all cases had obtained court orders to
gather CSLI pursuant to the SCA.302 A court order requirement is the
middle ground between no warrant and a full warrant, since individuals
have already “exposed” their CSLI information by using a cell phone,
reducing their expectation of privacy therein.303
Requiring a court order based on reasonable suspicion is the moderate
approach, but no state legislature has adopted it yet.304 The rationale
supporting a court order standard tracks Congress’ intent in adopting the
SCA.305 With the SCA, Congress sought a “fair balance between the
privacy expectations of American citizens and the legitimate needs of
law enforcement agencies.”306 The SCA, which requires a court order to
access electronic non-content data,307 was written to protect privacy lest
it “gradually erode as technology advances.”308
Search warrants require probable cause, but under typical definitions,
subpoenas and court orders do not.309 A court order generally requires
specific and articulable facts showing that there are reasonable grounds
to believe that the records or other information sought is relevant and
material to an ongoing criminal investigation.310 Reasonable suspicion

300. Ellen Nakashima, Little-Known Surveillance Tool Raises Concerns by Judges, Privacy
Activists, WASH. POST (Mar. 27, 2013), https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/nationalsecurity/little-known-surveillance-tool-raises-concerns-by-judges-privacyactivists/2013/03/27/8b60e906-9712-11e2-97cd-3d8c1afe4f0f_story.html [https://perma.cc/9F6R7JE9] (quoting Chris Soghoian).
301. United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 716 (1984).
302. Graham, 2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 9797 at *13; Davis, 785 F.3d at 511–13; Carpenter, 819
F.3d at 886; Historical Cell Site Data, 724 F.3d at 615.
303. Graham, 2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 9797 at *12; see also id.at *16–22.
304. ACLU, supra note 289.
305. S. REP. NO. 99-541, at 5 (1986), as reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3555, 3358.
306. Id.
307. 18 U.S.C. § 2703 (2012).
308. S. REP. NO. 99-541, at 5.
309. Fishman, supra note 58, at 1010.
310. 18 U.S.C. §2703(d) (2002).
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means that the police, acting under a reasonable person standard, have
specific and articulable facts connecting a suspect to criminal activity. In
contrast, a warrant requires probable cause, meaning a reasonable person
under the circumstances would believe that a crime either had been or
was about to be committed.311
Thus the reasonable suspicion required by a court order is an
intermediate standard, below probable cause but above the mere
relevance standard required for federal use of a pen register or trap-andtrace device.312 Professor Orin Kerr, a scholar well-versed in these
issues, approves of a reasonable suspicion standard even for content
data, which has traditionally received more protection than metadata.313
C.

Require a Warrant Based on Probable Cause

Requiring a warrant based on probable cause was, until recently, an
uncommon solution.314 A warrant based on probable cause ensures
heightened privacy protections for CSLI.315 Under this approach, law
enforcement would fill out a standard form describing the nature of the
search, the place to be searched, and the items to be “seized” (here,
location information).316 The requesting officer would need to detail the
probable cause linking the items to be seized with a particular endeavor
and the specified location.317
Advocates for a full warrant requirement argue that tracking CSLI
enables the government to track a defendant across public and private
spaces and discover some of the private activities and personal habits of
the user.318 Under this analysis, cell phone users have a reasonable

311. See supra text accompanying note 39.
312. In re United States for an Order Directing Provider of Elec. Commc’n. Serv. to Disclose
Records to the Gov’t, 620 F.3d 304, 314 (3d Cir. 2010).
313. 18 U.S.C. §2703(d) (2012); Orin S. Kerr, A User’s Guide to the Stored Communications Act,
and a Legislator’s Guide to Amending It, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1208, 1234–35 (2004); see also
discussion of Fourth Amendment protections of content data, supra Part III.
314. Kim Zetter, New Bill Would Force Cops to Get Stingray Warrants, WIRED MAG. (Nov. 3,
2015, 3:27 PM), https://www.wired.com/2015/11/new-bill-would-force-cops-to-get-warrants-before
-spying-with-stingrays/ [https://perma.cc/EW88-E4PB] (noting widespread use of Stingrays without
a warrant, and the new warrant requirement).
315. The Fourth Amendment requires that warrants be issued based on probable cause. U.S.
CONST. amend. IV.
316. Andrew D. Huynh, Note, What Comes After “Get a Warrant”: Balancing Particularity and
Practicality in Mobile Device Search Warrants Post-Riley, 101 CORNELL L. REV. 187, 197 (2015).
317. Id.
318. United States v. Graham, 796 F.3d 332, 345 (4th Cir. 2015).
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expectation of privacy in their aggregate location information, so a
warrant based on probable cause should be required.319
A full warrant has traditionally been required for content searches of
homes and even of cell phones.320 Location information, however, is not
content data; it merely discloses where an individual is at a given time,
providing much less information about a person than the contents of
their home or the contents of communications on their phone. Even
those advocating for a general warrant requirement for CSLI note that
serious crimes, such as terrorism and kidnappings, should be exceptions
to a general warrant requirement for CSLI.321 Yet the United States
Supreme Court has repeatedly refused to differentiate between the
seriousness of different crimes in determining when probable cause is
required.322 A full warrant requirement could therefore be an undue
burden on law enforcement, as it would require the highest level of
privacy protection at an early stage of the investigation—when officers
are unlikely to have enough evidence to obtain a warrant.
D.

Examples of Enacted Legislation

Washington, California, Virginia, Minnesota, Utah, and the
Department of Justice have adopted statutes and policies regulating law
enforcement’s use of cell site simulators.323 The DOJ policy requires law
enforcement to include all of the information required under a federal
pen register order324 when applying to use a cell site simulator.325 The
319. Id.
320. Riley v. California, __ U.S. __, 134 S. Ct. 2473 (2014) (unless an exception to the warrant
requirement applies).
321. Elliott, supra note 151, at 15.
322. ALLEN, supra note 246, at 432–35; Jeff Welty, Probable Cause: The Same for All Crimes?,
N.C. CRIM. L. (June 28, 2011), http://nccriminallaw.sog.unc.edu/probable-cause-the-same-for-allcrimes/ [https://perma.cc/WS2R-2M3N].
323. See CAL. GOV’T CODE. § 53166 (West 2016); MINN. STAT. § 626A.42 (West 2014); UTAH
CODE ANN. § 77-23c-102 (West 2016); VA. CODE ANN. 19.2-70.3 (West 2016); WASH. REV. CODE
§ 9.73.260 (West 2015); Matthew McCoy, New StingRay Policies for Both Washington State and
the Department of Justice, WASH. J.L., TECH. & ARTS BLOG (Oct. 14, 2015),
https://wjlta.wordpress.com/2015/10/14/new-StingRay-policies-for-both-washington-state-and-thedepartment-of-justice/ [https://perma.cc/AHK8-K9SC]. See also HB 1408, 2015 Gen. Assemb.,
Reg. Sess. (Va. 2015), https://www.richmondsunlight.com/bill/2015/hb1408/ [https://perma.cc/
W4N8-44NG]; Sub. HB 5640, 2016 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ct. 2016), https://www.cga.ct.gov/
2016/ACT/pa/2016PA-00148-R00HB-05640-PA.htm [https://perma.cc/PGX4-LJXG]; SB 178,
2015 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Ca. 2015), https://leginfo. legislature.ca.gov/faces/billTextClient.xhtml?
bill_id=201520160SB178 [https://perma.cc/4NYD-9H97].
324. 18 U.S.C. § 3123 (2012).
325. McCoy, supra note 323.
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DOJ’s policy also “follows Washington’s lead” on data retention and
deletion, requiring the application to detail how the data will be collected
and that it will be disposed of within 30 days.326
Washington’s efforts in this area are of note because Washington has
historically been more protective of privacy than other jurisdictions.327
After the United States Supreme Court held that individuals had no
reasonable expectation of privacy in the contents of garbage left on their
curb for collection,328 the Washington State Supreme Court granted
greater protections, holding that an officer’s search of a suspect’s trash
required a warrant.329 The Washington Constitution surpasses the
protections against unreasonable search and seizure afforded by the
Fourth Amendment.330 Article I section 7, which provides that “[n]o
person shall be disturbed in his [or her] private affairs, or his home
invaded, without authority of law,” protects people from warrantless
searches.331 The Washington legislature’s solution to CSLI and StingRay
use is based in enhanced privacy protections, and has been lauded by
privacy advocates.332
1.

Details of the Washington Statute

The Washington legislation requires a court order for StingRays
under the pen register statute, based on probable cause.333 The
Washington statute is “one of the most aggressive anti-tracking
measures in the nation.”334 Washington’s heightened concerns and
protections of privacy surpass that of the majority of states, which have
not imposed privacy requirements beyond those required by the Fourth

326. Id.
327. State v. Boland, 115 Wash. 2d 571, 577–78, 800 P.2d 1112, 1115 (1990) (discussing
historical protections that the Washington State Supreme Court has imposed under article 1, section
7 of the Washington State Constitution, beyond those provided by the Fourth Amendment).
328. California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 43–45 (1988).
329. Boland, 115 Wash. 2d at 57880, 800 P.2d at 111617.
330. WASH. CONST. art. I, § 7.
331. Id.
332. Cyrus Farivar, Cops Must Now Get a Warrant to Use Stingrays in Washington State, ARS
TECHNICA (May 12, 2015, 6:49 AM), http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2015/05/cops-must-nowget-a-warrant-to-use-stingrays-in-washington-state/ [https://perma.cc/HPV9-HJZR].
333. WASH. REV. CODE § 9.73.260 (West 2015).
334. Russell Brandom, Washington State Will Require a Warrant for Stingray Cell-Phone
Tracking, THE VERGE (May 12, 2015), http://www.theverge.com/2015/5/12/8591491/StingRaycell-phone-trackers-washington-state-law-tacoma [https://perma.cc/SY5J-RASC].
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Amendment.335 Indeed, the ACLU has lauded Washington’s leadership
in regulating StingRays.336
The amendment expands Chapter 9.73 of the Revised Code of
Washington to require either informed consent or a warrant based on
probable cause for general collection of a person’s electronic data or
metadata.337 The regulations applicable to pen registers and trap-andtrace devices now extend to regulate cell site simulators: law
enforcement must obtain a warrant to install and use a cell site simulator,
unless there is “probable cause to believe an emergency exists.”338
When applying for a warrant to use a StingRay, law enforcement
must provide an extensive list of precise information to the issuing
judge.339 This information includes: (A) the telephone or account
number the officers or agents are trying to trace; (B) the physical
location of the device sought (if known); (C) the type of device the
officers or agents are trying to trace; (D) the geographic area where the
StingRay will be used; (E) all categories of metadata, data, or
information that will be collected; (F) whether or not the device will
collect that data of third parties; and (G) any disruptions to
communications that the device may cause.340 As further protection, the
statute requires law enforcement to proactively limit and immediately
delete any third party data collected.341 They must also delete the
suspect’s metadata within thirty days, unless there is probable cause to
suggest that the metadata provides evidence of a crime.342
Washington’s requirement that law enforcement explain StingRay
technology to judges approving use of the devices is in keeping with
privacy advocates’ admonitions that “if the government wants to use
invasive surveillance technology like [StingRays], it must explain the

335. See Jack L. Landau, Should State Courts Depart from the Fourth Amendment? Search and
Seizure, State Constitutions, and the Oregon Experience, 77 MISS. L.J. 369, 373 n.17 (2007).
336. Washington Becomes a Leader in Restricting Use of Invasive Stingrays, ACLU (May 13,
2015),
https://www.aclu.org/news/washington-becomes-leader-restricting-use-invasive-stingrays
[https://perma.cc/3L4P-5NCS]. As of the editing of this Note, Virginia, Connecticut, and California
have followed suit. See supra note 323.
337. WASH. REV. CODE § 9.73.260 (West 2015).
338. S. REP. NO. 1440, 2015 Reg. Sess., (Wa. 2015) http://app.leg.wa.gov/documents/billdocs/
2015-16/Htm/Bill%20Reports/Senate/1440-S.E%20SBR%20LAW%2015.htm
[https://perma.cc/
QX5A-XZFL] (Note that the statute contains an emergency situation exception to the warrant
requirement).
339. WASH. REV. CODE § 9.73.260 (4)(c)(ii) (West 2015).
340. Id.
341. WASH. REV. CODE § 9.73.260 (6)(c) (West 2015).
342. Id.
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technology to the courts so they can perform their judicial oversight
function as required by the Constitution.”343 Understanding the
technology is “critical to deciding who may possess and use cell site
simulators, to what extent, and for what purposes.”344 Under the statute,
the requested warrant must clearly explain the technology to the issuing
magistrate.345
A statute requiring law enforcement to describe how StingRays work
is helpful because it reduces the societal costs of secrecy around the
technology.346 The less the public knows about the workings,
availability, and use of StingRays, the less demand the public creates for
secured communications.347 This accordingly increases individuals’ risk
of being intercepted.348 The FBI’s response to this concern is that overdisclosure of CSLI technology will enable criminals and terrorists to
thwart investigations by modifying their behavior.349 Yet many agents
are still using StingRays with a pen register application that does not
explain the use of the technology, and there are multiple reports of
judges approving pen register orders without knowing that they are
actually approving StingRay use.350 Leaving judges in the dark as to
what they are approving could lead to general noncompliance by
magistrates or burdensome litigation to overturn improperly obtained
court orders.351

343. Linda Lye, In Court: Uncovering Stingrays, A Troubling New Location Tracking Device,
ACLU BLOG (Oct 22, 2012, 12:45 PM), https://www.aclu.org/blog/court-uncovering-stingraystroubling-new-location-tracking-device [https://perma.cc/CZ9R-DSLP].
344. Hardman, supra note 21, at 28.
345. WASH. REV. CODE § 9.73.260 (4)(c)(ii)(C) (West 2015).
346. See Stephanie K. Pell & Christopher Soghoian, Your Secret StingRay’s No Secret Anymore:
The Vanishing Government Monopoly Over Cell Phone Surveillance and Its Impact on National
Security and Consumer Privacy, 28 HARV. J. L. & TECH. 1, 6–7 (2014).
347. Id.
348. Id.
349. Affidavit of FBI Supervisory Special Agent Bradley S. Morrison, Chief, Tracking
Technology Unit, Operation Technology Division in Quantico Division, at 2, Apr. 11, 2014,
attachment to City’s Verified Answer, Hodai v. City of Tucson, No. C20141225 (Ariz. Sup. Ct.
Apr. 14, 2014).
350. See Nakashima, supra note 300; E-mail from Miranda Kane, Chief, Criminal Div., U.S.
Attorney’s Off. N.D. Cal., to USACAN-Attorneys-Criminal, U.S. Dep’t of Justice (May 23, 2011,
11:55 AM), https://www.aclu.org/files/assets/doj_emails_on_stingray_requests.pdf [https://perma.
cc/3VUR-TNQH].
351. See, e.g., Martin, supra note 3.
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Other State Statutes

Like Washington, California, Minnesota, Utah, and Virginia require a
warrant for both historical and real-time CSLI.352 The statutes are
substantially similar, with differences as noted below.
California requires a high level of public disclosure: in order for an
agency to acquire a StingRay, the local legislative body must approve
the acquisition at a public meeting.353 Once the agency has acquired the
device, they must provide conspicuous public notice of the acquisition
on their department’s website.354
Minnesota, Utah, and Virginia explicitly list the permissible
exceptions to the warrant requirement.355 Minnesota permits officers to
obtain location information without a tracking warrant when the device
is lost or stolen; when the owner has called to request emergency
services or has given affirmative consent to the search; or in another
emergency situation involving risk of death or serious physical harm.356
Utah does not require a warrant if the owner has reported the device
stolen; has consented to the search; has “voluntarily and publicly
disclosed the location information;” or if there is a judicially recognized
exception to the warrant requirements, such as exigent circumstances.357
Virginia follows in the same vein, but also allows a user’s legal guardian
or next of kin to consent to a StingRay search if they believe that the
user is in personal danger.358
Some states with a warrant requirement allow for a grace period. The
Washington statute grants a grace period to officers who use a StingRay
without a warrant: they have forty-eight hours within which to obtain
court authorization.359 If they fail to obtain authorization, the evidence
gathered is not admissible in a legal proceeding.360 Virginia grants a
longer grace period of three days.361 None of the other states grants any
grace period, requiring officers to either obtain a warrant or lose any
352. CAL. GOV’T CODE. § 53166 (West 2016); MINN. STAT. § 626A.42 (West 2014); UTAH
CODE ANN. § 77-23c-102 (West 2016); VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-70.3 (West 2016); WASH. REV.
CODE § 9.73.260 (West 2015).
353. CAL. GOV’T CODE. § 53166(c)(1) (West 2016).
354. CAL. GOV’T CODE. § 53166(c)(2).
355. MINN. STAT. § 626A.42; UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-23c-102; VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-70.3.
356. MINN. STAT. § 626A.42(b)(1)-(5).
357. UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-23c-102(2)(a).
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evidence collected. Once a judge issues a warrant, both Virginia and
Washington limit the tracking period to thirty days, subject to possible
extension in additional thirty-day periods.362
While the only penalty provided by Washington for violating the
statute is a gross misdemeanor charge,363 California expressly provides
for actual damages of no less than $2,500, with potential awards of
punitive damages and attorney’s fees.364 Utah, while not providing any
specific penalties, does create a safe harbor for phone companies that
comply with law enforcement requests.365
These differences are likely a byproduct of the drafting process of
each statute: while Washington amended its pen register statute to
include StingRays, other states appear to have written the statutes anew.
But with the exception of these minor differences, the various statutes all
provide the same basic requirement of a warrant based upon probable
cause.
CONCLUSION
Regardless of which approach states take, they should pass legislation
that clarifies law enforcements’ burdens before collecting CSLI. Circuit
courts’ treatment of CSLI, as well as the United States Supreme Court’s
silence on the issue, creates a need for clarity at the state level. This Note
aims to help states determine the proper legislative solution to law
enforcement’s use of cell site simulators such as StingRays.
Even if a circuit court has held that CSLI is available under the thirdparty doctrine without a court order or a warrant, state legislatures can
still provide enhanced protections by requiring a court order or a
warrant. Furthermore, if the United States Supreme Court considers
CSLI, the Court will look to existing state laws to inform its analysis of
the issues in question. States’ adoption of clear and simple rules will
promote long-term stability in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.
Whether states require a court order or a warrant, a legislative solution
would help resolve the current confusion among states and in circuit
courts.
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